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Abstract 
There is a strong conceptual association between improvement and effort. Therefore, we 
propose that people tend to use improvement as a heuristic for judging effort in others. 
Hence, they would perceive greater effort in improved performance records than in non-
improved records with superior overall performance. To examine whether people use 
improvement as a heuristic for effort, we compared judgments of effort investments and 
trait effort in improved and consistently-strong performance profiles with equivalent 
recent performance. Across six empirical studies, participants thought that those with 
improved profiles exerted more effort and were more hardworking than those with 
consistently-strong profiles, and this resulted in a preference for improved candidates 
when making decisions (e.g., selecting among candidates for a promotion). Even when 
we introduced manipulations that highlighted strengths of the consistent profiles, 
participants still made effort judgements in favour of improvement (Studies 2 and 3). 
Moreover, participants had a greater tendency to mention effort as a reason for selecting 
an improved (vs. consistently-strong) candidate for an award (Study 4). Furthermore, two 
studies (Studies 5 and 6) showed that the use of improvement as a heuristic for effort was 
restricted to contexts with considerable ambiguity. Finally, we examined the overall 
effects using meta-analyses (Study 7).  Overall, the results provided converging evidence 
that people use improvement as a heuristic for judging effort, particularly in contexts that 
are relatively ambiguous, and that these judgments can have implications for important 
decisions.  
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“It is only through labor and painful effort, by grim energy and resolute courage, 
that we move on to better things.” - Theodore Roosevelt 
As this saying suggests, people tend to see a strong association between 
improvement and effort. This association stems from the belief that if an individual works 
hard, his/her performance will get better. Because of the strength of this association, we 
propose that people intuitively perceive improvement to be a cue signaling an underlying 
exertion of effort. The use of improvement as an indicator of effort may be an appealing 
heuristic (i.e., mental shortcut) in many important decision contexts. For example, in 
graduate school admissions or workplace decisions, decision makers need to form 
judgments about others based on performance records in which patterns of performance 
are often salient in the absence of direct information about effort. Therefore, in these 
contexts, patterns of performance can influence effort judgments, which can in turn 
influence the decisions made (e.g., whom to hire or whom to accept into an academic 
program). It is important to examine judgments of effort and how they can be influenced 
by patterns of performance (e.g., improvement) because of the important role these 
judgments can play in such consequential decisions. The present research is the first to 
explore the potential use of improvement as a heuristic for effort and its impact on 
decision-making in various employment settings and in the academic context. 
Heuristic Judgments 
 People employ heuristics – or mental shortcuts- frequently and ubiquitously. In 
many cases, the use of heuristics reflects intuitive processes that are elicited by features 
of the judgment task (Gilovich, Griffin, & Kahneman, 2002). These types of heuristics 
have been referred to as “judgmental heuristics” (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002, p. 20). 
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Dual process models of cognition provide a framework for understanding when and why 
judgmental heuristics guide overt judgments. For example, according to the two systems 
model of reasoning, there are two distinct approaches to judgment: one is intuitive, fast, 
and effortless (System 1); whereas the other is more deliberative, slow, and effortful 
(System 2). The two systems may operate simultaneously and can sometimes compete for 
directing overt judgments (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002). Judgmental heuristics are 
largely the result of System 1 reasoning; they stem from intuitive associations. When 
facing a difficult question, people may end up answering a simpler related question based 
on intuitions that come to mind effortlessly. In other words, instead of making the more 
challenging judgment of the “target attribute”, people make a judgment regarding a 
related “heuristic attribute”; this process has been referred to as “attribute substitution” 
(Kahneman & Frederick, 2002, p. 53). For instance, when asked to judge the frequency 
of words starting with the letter “r” versus the letter “k” in the English language, people 
may instead assess the availability of exemplars for each. This is a classic demonstration 
of the use of the “availability heuristic”, whereby the heuristic attribute, availability of 
exemplars, replaces the target attribute in question. According to Kahneman and 
Frederick, judgmental heuristics direct judgments when particular conditions are met: 
First, the accessibility of the target attribute needs to be lower than that of the related 
heuristic attribute. Second, System 2 operations should not reject or override the heuristic 
judgment. More generally, judgmental heuristics tend to guide judgments in contexts that 
have a considerable level of ambiguity or uncertainty. 
It is noteworthy that in the example of attribute substitution outlined above, the 
availability of exemplars tends to be associated with frequency to some extent. Therefore, 
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the attribute substitution process can provide an efficient mental shortcut, leading to valid 
judgments in many cases. Nevertheless, because the heuristic attribute is not perfectly 
correlated with the target attribute (e.g., availability of exemplars is not a perfect 
indicator of frequency), there are cases where attribute substitution leads to systematic 
biases in judgment. Indeed, there is a huge body of research demonstrating how the use 
of heuristics may sometimes lead people to overlook important diagnostic aspects of a 
situation and to engage in systematic biases in judgment (Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly, 
1989; Gilovich et al., 2002; Kruger, Wirtz, Van Boven, & Altermatt, 2004; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974).  
 In the present research, we explore the use of improvement as a heuristic for 
judging effort. As mentioned earlier, we believe that there is a strong conceptual 
association between improvement and effort, at least in Western cultures where the 
present set of studies was conducted. Moreover, information about effort investments in 
others is typically harder to access than performance records, which are often tracked and 
made accessible for evaluation purposes. Therefore, when people are being asked to 
judge the amount of effort invested by another person, they could rely on salient trends in 
performance records (e.g., improvement or consistency) as an indicator of effort. In these 
contexts, improvement can be used as a substitute for the target attribute, which is effort. 
It is important to note that in some cases, improvement can be a valid cue for making 
judgments about effort. For example, think of two employees starting a new job at an 
identical low performance level. Following the initial low performance, one employee 
improved steadily to reach a much higher performance level, whereas the other 
consistently performed at a low level. In this case, it would be reasonable to think that the 
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improved employee invested greater effort than the consistent employee, assuming other 
variables are held constant. However, as with other heuristics, we propose that the 
reliance on improvement to judge effort may sometimes lead people to overlook other 
important diagnostic aspects of a situation and to make erroneous judgments. For 
example, would people perceive greater effort in improved performance records than in 
non-improved records with superior overall performance? We propose that this can occur 
when evaluating an improved record and a consistently strong record, and that these 
effort perceptions can influence preferences when making consequential decisions 
involving these two types of performance records. 
Preferences for Improvement and Consistency  
Imagine being on a committee that evaluates a number of employee profiles with 
the goal of selecting one employee for promotion. You come across two profiles with 
equally strong recent performance but different patterns leading to that strong 
performance: one employee has been consistently performing at a strong level, whereas 
the other started much lower and improved steadily to reach that level. Who do you think 
has invested more effort? Which employee would you view as more hardworking and 
persistent in their effort? Consequently, as a committee member evaluating the two 
employees, who would you recommend for the promotion? To examine the use of 
improvement as a heuristic, the present research focuses on how evaluators perceive the 
effort invested by consistent and improved performance profiles with identical final 
performance, and how these judgments ultimately influence decisions involving these 
two types of profiles.  
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Importantly, there are a number of evident strengths displayed in the consistent 
profile in the above scenario. Given that recent performance is equivalent in the improved 
and the consistent profiles, this implies that at every point in time, the consistent 
employee’s performance was either equivalent or superior to that of the improved 
employee. Hence, the consistent employee had a stronger overall performance (average 
performance). One might think that strong performance could indicate that the employee 
has been putting great effort in his/her work day after day and that this, in turn, could lead 
him/her to be evaluated more favourably. The consistent pattern may also attest to the 
reliability and dependability of this individual. Together, these reasons could drive a 
preference for consistency over improvement in performance; particularly in this example 
where recent performance is equivalent. Despite these strengths, we expect that people 
would rely on improvement as a heuristic for effort. This could lead them to overlook 
strengths of the consistent profile and to judge his/her effort less favourably.   
To our knowledge, this proposition has not been addressed in previous research. 
However, broadly speaking, the present studies can be situated in a body of work in 
psychology that has examined general preferences for consistency and improvement. 
Much of this research has focused on evaluations of the self – as opposed to evaluating 
these trends in others. Considerable research shows that people sometimes prefer 
consistency over change (Cialdini, Trost, & Newsom, 1995; Festinger, 1957; Heider, 
1958; Zajonc, 1960). For example, classic lines of work on cognitive balance theory 
(Heider, 1958), cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957), and the foot-in-the-door effect 
(Freedman & Fraser, 1966) emphasize people’s motivation to perceive consistency in 
their attitudes and behaviours. The preference for consistency has also been 
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conceptualized as an individual difference (Cialdini et al., 1995). The scale developed to 
assess this variable includes items that measure the degree to which people prefer to see 
consistency in the self and others (Cialdini et al., 1995). Notably, however, research that 
employed this scale still focused on the scale’s utility in predicting a preference for 
consistency within one’s own attitudes and behaviours (e.g., Bator & Cialdini, 2006; 
Guadango, Asher, Demaine, & Cialdini, 2001; Newby-Clark, McGregor, & Zanna, 
2002).  
There is also a sizable body of research showing that people sometimes display a 
general preference for improvement over other intertemporal trends. For example, there 
is a wealth of evidence suggesting that people are motivated to see improvement in the 
self (e.g., McAdams, Reynolds, Lewis, Patten, & Bowman, 2001; McFarland & Buehler, 
2012; Wilson & Ross, 2001; Zell & Alicke, 2010). Less is known about perceptions and 
evaluations of improvement and consistency in others, which is examined in the current 
research.  
Recent studies started exploring the question of when and why people may prefer 
improvement over other alternative performance patterns in others (El Gamal & Buehler, 
2014; Pettit, Sivanathan, Gladstone, & Marr, 2013; Zell & Alicke, 2010). For example, 
Pettit et al. (2013) examined how people judge the current status of others based on 
changes in their status rankings across time. Improvement in rankings was viewed more 
favourably than either consistency or decline: Of particular note, targets that ascended in 
rank were perceived as having higher status than those that maintained the same rank 
over time, even though the final ranking was identical. Zell and Alicke (2010) examined 
evaluations of improvement, decline, and consistency in percentile rankings of others, 
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with the average percentile ranking being held constant. Similar to Pettit et al. (2013), 
they found that people who improved in percentile ranking were evaluated more 
favourably than those who held the same ranking over time or declined in ranking. These 
findings suggest that improvement may be viewed more favourably than consistency in 
others. However, the studies focus on judgements of improved and consistent status 
rankings, which may differ from judgements of absolute performance patterns. For 
instance, one’s absolute performance may improve but their status ranking could stay the 
same if the other individuals being ranked are all improving at a similar rate. To address 
this limitation, El Gamal and Buehler (2014) examined comparisons of an improved and 
a consistent performance profile, with the final performance level being constant (e.g., a 
student improving from a B-average to an A-average vs. one who received straight A’s). 
The two profiles were presented side-by-side to allow participants to simultaneously 
evaluate them. This study found that participants preferred profiles displaying improved 
performance over consistent high performance in decision contexts that place a greater 
emphasis on future potential than on actual achievement. In contrast, when the decision 
context emphasized past achievement, participants preferred consistent high performance 
over improved performance.  
Taken together, the reviewed literature suggests that improvement and 
consistency can each be appealing in certain contexts. Of particular relevance to the 
current research, recent studies (Pettit et al., 2013; El Gamal & Buehler, 2014; Zell & 
Alicke, 2010) examined the preferences of improvement versus consistency in others. 
These studies focused on the role of performance or status evaluations and future 
expectations pertaining to these types of evaluations in driving preferences. In the present 
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research, we further examine preferences for improvement versus consistent strong 
performance in others, and we focus on the role of effort perceptions in driving decision 
preferences. To date, researchers have not yet examined whether effort perceptions can 
be one factor underlying preferences for improvement over alternate intertemporal 
patterns; and we think that these perceptions would play an important role. 
Effort Perceptions 
Social psychologists have long been interested in perceptions of effort. According 
to a classic body of literature on attributions (Heider, 1958; Jones, 1989; Weiner, 
Heckhausen, Meyer, & Cook, 1972), effort is one of four types of causes that people 
commonly use to explain outcomes of their own and others’ behaviours. For example, 
success can be thought of as a result of great effort investments, whereas failure can be 
seen as the result of a lack of effort. The other three types of causal attributions in the 
literature are ability, luck, and task difficulty. These attributions differ in terms of two 
dimensions: locus of control (i.e., whether they are controlled internally by the individual 
versus by other factors that are external to the individual) and variability (whether they 
are perceived to be variable or fixed). Both ability and effort tend to be conceptualized as 
internal attributions, for which the locus of control is within the individual. Generally, 
ability has been classified as a fixed attribution, whereas effort has been conceptualized 
as a modifiable variable that can change with time. However, some attribution 
researchers (e.g., Jones, 1989; Weiner et al., 1972) acknowledge that effort can 
sometimes be thought of as a stable trait. For example, an individual can be described as 
being lazy or hard working. Therefore, Weiner and colleagues (1972) argue that effort is 
a unique attribution in that it includes both stable and variable elements, and that this 
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unique feature makes it particularly important for understanding attributions of 
achievement. 
One line of attribution research that is particularly relevant to the present studies 
examines the role of temporal trajectories in attributional judgments (Butler, 2000; Jones, 
Rock, Shaver, Goethals, & Ward, 1968; Jones & Welsh, 1971). The main focus of this 
research was on attributions of ability and how they can be influenced by temporal 
patterns, such as improvement or decline. For example, Jones and colleagues (1968) 
presented participants with a random, ascending, or descending pattern of success, which 
was ostensibly achieved by another participant in a problem-solving task, and measured 
attributions of intellectual ability and future performance expectations for the 
‘participant’ displaying each of the patterns. Performance patterns were presented one 
point at a time (i.e., in a sequential manner). The results of this study showed that people 
inferred greater ability from the descending pattern of success (i.e., declining 
performance), compared to the random or ascending (i.e., improving  performance) 
pattern.  The authors explained that participants experienced a primacy effect, whereby 
the initial level of success biased their memory for subsequent success levels. Hence, 
those who began at a high level and declined over time were perceived to have greater 
intellectual ability than those who began at a low level of success and improved over 
time. Jones and Welsh (1971) demonstrated the reversal of these effects. Specifically, 
they showed that in the context of strategic play, recency effects could emerge leading 
people to attribute greater ability to those displaying increasing levels of success. The 
context of a strategic game may be unique in that it places a great weight on the final 
standing (whether the player ended up winning or losing). Hence, a recovery from losses 
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(i.e., ascending pattern of outcomes) may be seen as an indicator of ability in this domain.  
It is important to note that the reviewed studies by Jones and colleagues (1968; 1971) 
presented the outcomes in a sequential manner; participants were not presented with the 
full record of performance at any point in time. The presentation format used in these 
studies triggered a reliance on memory when judging the overall performance pattern. 
Therefore, as explained above, the resulting judgments were greatly influenced by 
memory-based processes. These processes would not be applicable to the judgments 
studied in the present research where participants view full performance records so they 
do not need to construe the records from memory.  
The reviewed studies (Jones et al., 1968; Jones & Welsh, 1971) showed that the 
domain of performance (problem solving versus strategic play) may moderate the effects 
of temporal trajectories on attributional judgments of ability. Butler (2000) examined 
another moderating variable of these effects. Specifically, the author tested whether lay 
theories of intelligence (Dweck & Leggett, 1988) determine whether high school students 
perceive initial performance levels or last performance levels to be most diagnostic of 
another high school student’s math ability. The studies focused on judgments concerning 
improving and declining patterns of performance, with the average performance being 
held constant. The findings showed that entity theorists, who perceive intelligence to be 
fixed, tend to view initial performance levels as more diagnostic and to infer greater 
ability in a declining pattern of performance. In contrast, incremental theorists, who think 
that intelligence is changeable, tend to view final performance levels as more diagnostic 
and to infer greater ability in an improving pattern of performance. These results applied 
to judgments of the self and others. Butler (2000) also examined judgments of effort; 
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unlike ability judgments, effort judgments were not moderated by lay theories. Moreover, 
the study compared effort and ability judgments for the first and the last performance 
outcomes in each profile. In an improving profile, both effort and ability judgments were 
higher for the last (versus the first) outcome. In the declining profile, ability judgments 
were lower for the last (versus the first) outcome, whereas effort judgments did not differ. 
Notably, the results do not show whether, overall, effort attributions were different for the 
improving than for the declining profile.  Taken together, the reviewed studies explored 
the influence of intertemporal trends on attributional judgments (Butler, 2000; Jones, 
Rock, Shaver, Goethals, & Ward, 1968; Jones & Welsh, 1971), with a focus on 
attributions of ability. More research is needed to understand the influence of 
intertemporal performance trends on attributions of effort.  
Another line of attribution research examined the consequences of attributional 
judgments. Attributing personal success or failure to effort was shown to increase 
motivation and persistence in the face of failure, particularly with tasks that are 
moderately difficult (Weiner et al., 1972). Attributing others’ failure to low effort was 
shown to result in greater punishment/lower reward than attributing it to low ability, and 
attributing success to high effort resulted in lower punishment/greater reward than 
attributing it to high ability (Weiner & Kukla, 1970). Moreover, past research 
documented a trade-off between attributions of ability and attributions of effort (e.g., 
Heider, 1958; Jones, 1989). With performance level being constant, the more the 
performance is attributed to effort, the less it would be attributed to ability (and vice 
versa).  
12 
 
A more general question that captured the interest of social psychologists 
concerns the evaluations of high effort investments by the self and others, and of the 
outcomes associated with these investments. There is considerable evidence suggesting 
that effort investments can result in favourable judgments. For example, people value 
products that they have successfully created themselves and invested some effort in, and 
this has been labelled “the IKEA effect” (Norton, Mochon, & Ariely, 2012). Likewise, 
people evaluated a poem or a painting more favourably when they were told that the artist 
put a lot of time and effort into it (Kruger et al., 2004). The tendency to use effort as a 
cue indicating quality or value of outputs produced by others has been labeled “the effort 
heuristic” (Kruger et al., 2004). In line with this, consumer research shows that when a 
company invests apparent effort in production or product displays (controlling for the 
actual quality of products), consumers evaluate the company more favourably and 
indicate greater willingness to pay for its products - as long as the company’s persuasion 
motive is not made salient (Morales, 2005). While these studies suggest that perceptions 
of high effort would translate into favourable evaluations, there is some research 
suggesting that this may not always be the case.  
Building upon the work on “the effort heuristic”, Cho and Schwarz (2008) 
examined one variable that could determine whether high effort exerted by an artist 
would lead to inferences of higher quality of the artistic end product or not. Specifically, 
the authors examined the moderating role of naïve theories that people may have 
concerning effort. They reasoned that people may have the naïve theory that “good-art-
takes-effort”. When this theory is activated, high effort investments by the artist would 
lead evaluators to infer higher quality of the end product- in line with the findings of 
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Kruger and colleagues (2004). Alternatively, people may also have the naïve theory that 
“good-art-takes-talent”. When this alternative theory is activated, high effort investments 
would not lead evaluators to infer higher quality of the artistic end product. Moreover, 
when guided by the “good-art-takes-talent” theory, people may perceive low effort to 
reflect greater talent and better quality of the end product compared to no effort 
information (but not compared to high effort information). Hence, the same piece of 
information (e.g., high or low effort investments) may lead to vastly different inferences 
depending on the accessible naïve theory that is applied. Two empirical studies supported 
these hypotheses. These studies suggested that high effort can be interpreted in multiple 
ways and that it does not always translate into favourable overall judgments. 
Furthermore, studies by Tsay and Banaji (2011) showed that people hold the belief that 
artists who demonstrate early signs of effort and perseverance (strivers) will be higher 
achievers than artists with early signs of natural talent (naturals). Interestingly, however, 
the same set of studies showed that people’s actual choices and preferences in a decision-
making context revealed the opposite pattern whereby naturals were preferred over 
strivers. This effect has been labelled “the naturalness bias” (Tsay & Banaji, 2011), and it 
demonstrates another case where effort perceptions may not translate into favourable 
judgments. In line with this, Jones (1989) emphasized the trade-off between attributions 
of ability and effort, and argued that individuals tend to emphasize their natural 
competence and ability (i.e., stable attributions) rather than their effort (which can be 
viewed as variable) when engaging in self-promoting strategies. He also presented the 
following anecdotal example, which suggests that emphasizing ability is a more effective 
promotional strategy than emphasizing effort: 
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“In evaluating potential graduate students, how completely we ignore letters of 
recommendation that emphasize hard work and a pleasing personality” (Jones, 
1989, p. 479). 
Taken together, the reviewed literature provides considerable evidence supporting 
the idea that effort perceptions could translate into favourable evaluations (Kruger et al., 
2004; Morales, 2005; Norton et al., 2012), but it also presents some examples suggesting 
that this may not always be the case (Cho & Schwarz, 2008; Jones, 1989; Tsay & Banaji, 
2011). Overall, the studies suggest that effort could be interpreted and evaluated in 
different ways. Oftentimes, effort investments tend to be valued as signs of motivation, 
and to reflect positively on judgments of the products of effort as well as the producers. 
There are other times, however, when effort investments may suggest a lack of talent or 
natural ability, resulting in less positive evaluations, particularly in contexts where talent 
and natural ability are weighed heavily. Notably, the current empirical evidence 
supporting the latter view of effort focused on judgments and decisions made within 
artistic domains (Cho & Schwarz, 2008; Tsay & Banaji, 2011). In such domains, the 
naturalness of talent may be particularly valued over hard work. Less is known about the 
kinds of evaluations that result from judgments of effort in the non-artistic performance 
domains that we examine in the present research (e.g., performance of software 
developers, sales associates, science students, etc.). For instance, would perceiving a 
software developer to be hardworking be accompanied by a judgment that he/she has a 
low level of ability? When considering this hardworking developer for a promotion, 
would evaluators consider him/her as more deserving than another developer who is 
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viewed as less hardworking? These are among the questions that we are interested in 
exploring in the present research. 
The Present Research 
In the present research, we explore the influence of temporal patterns of 
performance on effort perceptions and subsequent evaluations. Specifically, we examine 
perceptions of effort in the context of comparisons of an improved and a consistent 
performance profile, with the final performance level being constant. People tend to 
associate improvement with hard work and effort. Hence, we test the novel proposition 
that people use improvement as a heuristic for effort, and hence devalue the amount of 
effort underlying consistent strong performance. When presented with an improved and a 
consistent profile with identical final performance, we expect that people would think 
that the improved profile reflects a greater investment of effort and a more hardworking 
character than the consistent profile. We also examine whether these judgments of effort 
would translate into more favourable judgments of deservingness in decisions that 
involve these two types of performance records (e.g., deservingness for a promotion 
opportunity). Additionally, in all studies, we assess participants’ perceptions of trait 
competence (i.e., ability) of the targets as well as trait effort to explore whether 
perceptions of higher effort investments in the improved profile would be accompanied 
with perceptions of lower competence and ability, relative to the consistent profile. If that 
is the case, it is possible that the higher effort judgements of the improved profile may 
not translate into judgments of higher deservingness of future opportunities.  
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We examine these questions in six studies and then we present a meta-analysis of 
the findings. In our first study (Studies 1A, 1B, and 1C) we test the basic hypothesis 
concerning effort judgments. Then, in Studies 2 and 3, we introduce procedures that 
highlight strengths of the consistent profile (higher average performance, superior 
performance at specific time points), and test whether the judgment of improvement as 
reflecting greater effort investments would be maintained under these conditions. In 
Study 3, we also examine whether judgments of effort would translate into an overall 
preference for improvement over consistency in a decision-making context (employee 
promotions). In Study 4, we examine whether participants would spontaneously mention 
effort more frequently when supporting the profile of an improved (vs. a consistently-
strong) candidate for an award. Building upon the premise that heuristics are employed in 
ambiguous decision contexts, we then test whether the level of ambiguity of the decision 
context would influence the degree to which people use improvement to make effort 
judgments (Study 5 and Study 6). In most of these studies (Studies 1-5), we focus on joint 
evaluation contexts, whereby the target profiles are presented side-by-side and are being 
evaluated simultaneously. We reasoned that, oftentimes, in hiring and selection decisions, 
decision makers evaluate and compare more than one candidate. Hence, this mode of 
evaluation reflects the types of judgments that are often made in various real world 
settings. In Study 6, however, we examine whether evaluators’ use of improvement to 
infer effort would be generalizable to separate evaluation contexts, in which each 
participant would only evaluate one target profile. Finally, we conducted a meta-analysis 
(Study 7) to assess the overall strength of the effects obtained in the current set of studies.  
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Studies 1A-1C 
In the first set of studies (1A-1C), we examined the basic question concerning the 
influence of improvement on effort judgments. Specifically, would evaluators think that 
an improved target has invested greater effort and is more hardworking than a 
consistently-strong target? We sought the answer to this question using students (Study 
1A), software developers (Study 1B), and course instructors (Study 1C) as targets of 
evaluation to examine the applicability of our propositions across these diverse contexts.  
Study 1A: Student Profiles 
Method 
Participants. Seventy-three undergraduate students from Wilfrid Laurier 
University (12 male, 56 female, 1 other, 4 unidentified; Mage = 18.93, SD = 2.26; 15 
Asian, 1 Black/African American, 42 White, 10 other, 5 unidentified) participated in this 
study. They were recruited through the psychology department research participants pool 
and they completed the study online in exchange for course credit. 
Procedure. Participants were invited to complete an online questionnaire 
examining their opinions and evaluations of other students. After completing a consent 
form, participants were presented with the profiles of two undergraduate students, 
including graphs depicting the students’ grade point averages for each term in university 
(See Appendix A). The graphs indicated that both students received an equally strong 
grade point average (A) in the last term, but one student had always performed at that 
level whereas the other had started with a B- average and improved steadily over time. 
The two profiles were presented side-by-side and the location on the screen (left versus 
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right side) was counterbalanced across participants. Also, the peripheral content in the 
profiles (e.g., student name, major, hobbies) was counterbalanced so that each profile was 
paired equally-often with the improved and consistent performance records. Participants 
then completed a series of measures concerning their views of the students, including the 
measures pertaining to this thesis research.
1 
As a measure of perceived effort, participants 
were asked to indicate how much effort they thought that each of the students has spent in 
studying for her university courses (1 = no effort at all, 7 = a lot of effort). Then, 
participants were told that we were interested in the first impression that they formed of 
the two students. They were presented with 14 seven-point scales with end points labelled 
with two opposite traits (e.g., hardworking vs. lazy). Four scales were related to effort 
(hardworking vs. lazy, motivated vs. not motivated, persistent vs. not persistent, 
determined vs. not determined). The remaining scales assessed judgments of warmth 
(warm vs. cold, likable vs. unlikable, outgoing vs. shy, an extrovert vs. an introvert), 
competence (competent vs. not competent, smart vs. stupid, intelligent vs. not 
intelligent), success (successful vs. not successful), and ambition (ambitious vs. not 
ambitious). Participants also rated the overall positivity of their first impression of the 
student (1= very negative, 7= very positive). Finally, participants completed additional 
exploratory measures and provided demographic information
2
. 
Results 
Our primary hypothesis was that participants would rate perceived effort as higher 
for the improved than for the consistent student. Consistent with this hypothesis, a paired 
t-test performed on the ratings of perceived effort revealed that participants thought that 
the improved student invested more effort in school (M = 6.22, SD = 0.97) than the 
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consistently-strong student (M = 5.81, SD = 1.21), t(71) = 1.98, p = .05 , d = 0.38. We 
also computed an index of effort-related traits (Cronbach’s α = .65 for the improved 
student and .83 for the consistent student). Participants rated the improved student higher 
on effort-related traits (M = 6.44, SD = 0.64) than the consistent student (M = 5.96, SD = 
0.88), t(72) = 3.58, p = .001, d = 0.63. Similarly, we computed an index of trait 
competence (Cronbach’s α = .77 for the improved student and .73 for the consistent 
student) and compared ratings of the improved and consistent profiles on this index. 
Participants rated the consistent student higher in terms of competence (M = 6.47, SD = 
0.66) than the improved student (M = 6.09, SD = 0.82), t(72) = 4.44, p = .001, d = 0.50 
(See Tables 1a and 1e for mean ratings and standard deviations of judgments in this 
study, Study 1B, and Study 1C).  
We also examined the correlations among the different types of judgments. 
Overall, effort perceptions, trait effort, and trait competence were positively correlated 
(See Table 1b). This was true for judgments of the improved (See Table 1c) and the 
consistent (See Table 1d) profiles in Studies 1A, 1B, and 1C. 
Study 1B: Employee Profiles 
Method 
Participants. Eighty adults from the United States (42 male, 34 female, 4 
unidentified; Mage = 37.61, SD = 13.77; 5 Asian, 7 Black/African American, 5 Hispanic 
or Latino, 56 White, 3 other, 4 unidentified) were recruited through Amazon Mechanical 
Turk (MTurk) and completed the study online in exchange for $0.50. 
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Procedure. Participants were invited to complete an online questionnaire 
examining their opinions and judgments of employee profiles. After completing a consent 
form, participants were presented with the profiles of two Software Developers in a high 
technology company. The profiles included the employees’ names and dates of birth. 
Participants were told that the two employees had joined the company at the same time 
(five years ago) and had received annual performance evaluations from their supervisors. 
Participants then viewed two graphs displaying the employees’ annual performance 
evaluations over the past five years rated on a scale from 1 (poor performance) to 10 
(outstanding performance; see Appendix C). The graphs indicated that both employees 
had received an equally-strong performance evaluation in the past year (final point on the 
graph: 8.5/10), but one employee had always performed around that level whereas the 
other had started with an evaluation of only 6/10 and improved steadily over time. The 
two profiles were presented side-by-side and the location on the screen (left versus right 
side) was counterbalanced. Also, the peripheral content (employee name and date of 
birth) was counterbalanced across participants so that each profile was paired equally-
often with the improved and consistent performance records. Participants then completed 
several rating scales concerning their perceptions of the employees. As a measure of 
perceived effort, they were asked to indicate how much effort they thought that each of 
the employees has spent on the job in the past five years (1 = no effort at all, 7 = a lot of 
effort). Then, participants reported their impressions of the two employees on the same 
trait rating scales that were used in Study 1A. The scales assessed trait effort, warmth, 
competence, success, ambition, and overall positivity. At the end of the study, 
participants reported demographic information. 
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Results 
Consistent with the hypothesis, participants thought that the improved employee 
invested more effort in the job (M = 6.26, SD = 0.91) compared to the consistent 
employee (M = 5.20, SD = 1.12), t(75) = 7.09, p < .001 , d = 1.04. Similarly, on the index 
of trait effort (Cronbach’s α = .92 for each of the improved and the consistent 
employees), participants rated the improved employee higher (M = 6.32, SD = 0.85) than 
the consistent employee (M = 5.23, SD = 1.13), t(76) = 7.99, p < .001, d = 1.08. On the 
index of trait competence (Cronbach’s α = .93 for the improved employee and .89 for the 
consistent employee), however, participants’ ratings of the improved employee (M = 
6.07, SD = 0.92) did not differ significantly from their ratings of the consistent employee 
(M = 5.98, SD = 0.92), t(76) = 0.95, p = .35, d = 0.10. 
Study 1C: Rate My Professor 
Method 
Participants. One-hundred and seven undergraduate students (26 male, 73 
female, 8 unidentified; Mage = 19.99, SD = 4.17; 10 Asian, 4 Black/African American, 3 
East Indian, 1 Hispanic or Latino, 72 White, 8 other, 9 unidentified) participated in this 
study. They were recruited through the psychology research participants pool at Wilfrid 
Laurier University and completed the study online in exchange for course credit. 
Procedure. Participants were invited to complete an online questionnaire titled 
“Rate My Professors”. After completing a consent form, participants viewed the profiles 
of two psychology course instructors including the reviews that each of the instructors 
had ostensibly received on a professor rating website (similar to reviews on the website 
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www.ratemyprofessors.com) in each of the past three years. The trends depicted 
improvement for the one profile and consistent high reviews for the other, with the final 
overall review of teaching quality being 4.1/5 for both (See Appendix D). Similar to the 
previous studies, the two profiles were presented side-by-side, and the location on the 
screen and names of instructors were counterbalanced across participants. Participants 
reported the amount of effort they thought that each of the instructors has spent in her 
teaching job in the past three years (1 = no effort at all, 7 = a lot of effort), and rated their 
first impressions of the two instructors using the same trait rating scales that were used in 
the previous studies. Finally, participants reported minimal demographic information 
(age and gender). 
Results 
Participants thought that the instructor with improved ratings had put more effort 
into her teaching job (M = 6.13, SD = 0.88) compared to the one who received 
consistently-strong ratings (M = 4.81, SD = 1.17), t(103) = 8.98, p < .001 , d = 1.28. 
Similarly, on the index of trait effort (Cronbach’s α = .86 for the improved instructor and 
.90 for the consistent instructor), participants rated the improved instructor higher (M = 
6.21, SD = 0.77) than the consistent instructor (M = 5.17, SD = 1.02), t(102) = 9.94, p < 
.001, d = 1.14. On the index of trait competence (Cronbach’s α = .77 for the improved 
instructor and .82 for the consistent instructor), however, participants’ ratings of the 
improved instructor (M = 5.89, SD = 0.86) and their ratings of the consistent instructor 
(M = 5.88, SD = 0.88) did not significantly differ, t(102) = 0.13, p = .90, d = 0.01. 
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To examine whether the items comprising the trait effort and trait competence 
indices in these studies represent two distinguishable sets of traits, we conducted 
Confirmatory Factor Analyses (See Appendix E). First, we combined the data from 
Studies 1A-1C, and then specified and tested the structural model for each of the 
improved and the consistent profiles. The results indicated that the model fit was 
adequate for improved profiles and excellent for consistent profiles, thus confirming the 
factor structure with four items measuring effort (hardworking, motivated, persistent, and 
determined) and three items measuring competence (competent, smart, and intelligent). 
These indices of trait effort and trait competence were used in subsequent studies. 
Study 2: Focusing on the Average versus the Trend 
 In the previous studies, we demonstrated that, across different contexts, 
participants thought that a profile depicting improved performance reflects a greater 
investment of effort compared to one depicting consistent strong performance. Notably, 
the consistent profiles used in these studies had a higher performance level on average 
than the improved profiles, and at no point in time displayed lower performance than the 
improved profiles. It would have been reasonable to infer that the consistently-strong 
performer must have always worked hard. Hence, these three studies employed a 
conservative test of the hypothesis, and they provided convergent evidence that people 
tend to associate improvement, rather than consistency, with hard work and effort.  
It could be argued that performance trends (i.e., improvement vs. consistency) 
were highly salient in these profiles, particularly in Study 1A and Study 1B where 
performance evaluations were presented on a graph. This presentation format may have 
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emphasized temporal change and thus drawn attention away from the fact that, on 
average, the consistent performer had outperformed the improved performer. As a result, 
it is possible that participants did not pay sufficient attention to the overall level of 
performance in the profiles, and hence they devalued the amount of effort underlying 
consistent strong performance. Indeed, past research suggests that when change is highly 
salient, people tend to place a greater weight on velocity (i.e., rate of change) than on 
position (e.g., level of performance) (Hsee, Abelson, & Salovey, 1991) when making 
various judgments and decisions. In Study 2, we manipulated participants’ focus on 
trends versus average performance level and tested whether this would moderate effects 
of improvement on perceived effort. 
Method 
Participants. One-hundred and twelve undergraduate students were recruited 
from the psychology research participants pool at Wilfrid Laurier University (28 male, 76 
female, 8 unidentified; Mage = 19.81, SD = 2.73; 21 Asian, 1 Black/African American, 4 
East Indian, 64 White, 15 other, 7 unidentified). They completed this study online in 
exchange for course credit. 
Procedure. In this study, participants were randomly assigned to one of three 
focus conditions: average focus, trend focus, or a control condition. Participants were 
presented with the profiles of two software developers in a high technology company. 
The profiles were similar to those used in Study 1B. Again, the profiles included minimal 
information about the employees (names and dates of birth) as well as their annual 
performance evaluations over the past five years. Unlike Study 1B, performance 
25 
 
evaluations were presented in tabular format (See Appendix F). The final performance 
evaluation for both employees was 8.5/10 (rated on a scale from 1 [poor performance] to 
10 [outstanding performance]), but one employee had always performed around that level 
whereas the other had started with an evaluation of only 5.7/10 and improved over time. 
The two tables were presented side-by-side, and both the location on the screen and the 
peripheral content of the profiles were counterbalanced across participants. Participants 
in the average focus condition were then instructed to calculate the average performance 
evaluation for each of the two employees. Participants in this condition were provided 
with a calculator on the screen and were reminded of how an average is computed. 
Participants in the trend focus condition were instructed to describe the overall 
performance trend for each of the two employees. Participants in the control condition 
did not complete either of these tasks. After that, all participants were asked to report 
their perceptions of the amount of effort that each of the employees has spent on the job 
in the past five years (1 = no effort at all, 7 = a lot of effort). Then, participants rated their 
impressions of the traits of the two employees using the trait rating scales from the 
previous studies. Finally, participants provided demographic information. 
Results 
Perceived effort. We submitted the perceived effort ratings to a 3 (Focus: 
average vs. trend vs. control) × 2 (Profile: improved vs. consistent) mixed analysis of 
variance (ANOVA). The main effect of profile was significant, F(1, 107) = 14.89, p < 
.001, d = 0.64, indicating that participants thought that the improved employee invested 
greater effort (M = 5.96, SD = 1.26) than the consistent employee (M = 5.18, SD = 1.19). 
No other effects were significant. Importantly, the thought focus × profile interaction was 
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not significant, F(2, 107) = 0.11, p = .90. This suggests that, regardless of their thought 
focus, participants rated the improved employee as having invested greater effort than the 
consistent employee (See Table 2a for mean ratings and standard deviations in each of 
the three conditions). 
Trait effort. We also submitted the trait effort index (Cronbach’s α = .85 for the 
improved employee and .86 for the consistent employee) to a 3 (Focus: average vs. trend 
vs. control) × 2 (Profile: improved vs. consistent) mixed ANOVA. Again, the main effect 
of profile was significant, F(1, 106) = 35.18, p < .001, d = 0.88. Participants rated the 
improved employee higher on effort-related traits (M = 6.15, SD = 0.91) than the 
consistent employee (M = 5.30, SD = 1.02). No other effects were significant. 
Importantly, the thought focus × profile interaction was not significant, F(2, 106) = 0.69, 
p = .50. This suggests that the improved employee was rated higher on effort-related 
traits than the consistent employee, regardless of the thought focus condition that 
participants were assigned to. 
Trait competence. We submitted the index of trait competence (Cronbach’s α = 
.83 for the improved instructor and .79 for the consistent instructor) to a 3 (Focus: 
average vs. trend vs. control) × 2 (Profile: improved vs. consistent) mixed ANOVA. Only 
the main effect of profile was significant (F[1, 105] = 18.99, p < .001), indicating that the 
consistent employee was perceived to be more competent (M = 5.99, SD = 0.69) than the 
improved employee (M = 5.58, SD = 0.88), d = 0.52. No other effects were significant.  
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Correlations among the main dependent measures in this study are presented in 
Tables 2b-2d. The mean ratings and standard deviations of the items comprising trait 
effort and trait competence are presented in Table 2e. 
Study 3: Unpacking Effort Judgements 
The previous studies provided converging evidence supporting the hypothesis that 
people use improvement as a heuristic for effort, and hence devalue the amount of effort 
underlying consistent strong performance. Furthermore, Study 2 provided evidence that 
this devaluation of effort is not just the result of overlooking performance levels because 
of the relative salience of performance trends. One goal of the current study is to test 
whether the differences in effort judgments across profiles have implications in decision-
making contexts. Specifically, would judging an improved employee as having invested 
greater effort than a consistently-strong employee result in favouring the former for a 
promotion, even though the latter has displayed stronger overall performance? A second 
goal of the current study is to further explore the possibility that participants may have 
overlooked differences in performance levels. This time, we introduce a manipulation of 
temporal unpacking of effort judgements to ensure that participants pay attention to 
differences in performance levels at individual time points. We test whether introducing 
this unpacking manipulation would attenuate the effect of improvement on effort 
judgments.  
Method 
Participants. The sample consisted of 105 adults (44 male, 55 female, 6 
unidentified; Mage = 36.60, SD = 13.16; 4 Asian, 5 Black/African American, 1 East 
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Indian, 4 Hispanic or Latino, 87 White, 1 other, 3 unidentified) who completed the study 
online. Participants were recruited through MTurk and compensated with $0.50. 
Procedure. Participants were presented with the employee profiles used in Study 
1B. We randomly assigned participants to a temporal unpacking condition or a control 
condition. In the unpacking condition, participants were first asked to judge the amount 
of effort that each of the employees put into his work in each of the five years depicted on 
the graph. That is, participants rated their judgments using slider bar measures with the 
ends labelled 0 (no effort at all) and 100 (a lot of effort). Participants in the control 
condition did not complete this unpacking task. After that, all participants were asked to 
indicate the overall amount of effort invested by each of the employees over the past five 
years. Again, responses were provided using a slider bar measure with the ends labelled 0 
(no effort at all) and 100 (a lot of effort). Participants also rated their impressions of the 
employees’ traits on the same trait rating scales used in earlier studies. Next, participants 
were presented with a scenario and were told to imagine it as if it was actually taking 
place. Specifically, they were told to imagine that they were part of a selection committee 
at the company in which the two employees worked. The company is offering 
a promotion opportunity to one of its current software developers and the two employees 
are the candidates for this position. Participants then indicated how deserving each of the 
two employees was of this promotion opportunity (1 = not at all deserving, 7 = very 
deserving). They were also asked to indicate their preference on a slider bar with the mid-
point labelled “I have no preference” and each of the end points indicating a definite 
preference for one of the employees over the other. Finally, participants completed 
demographic questions.  
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Results 
Perceived effort. Judgments of the overall effort invested over the five years 
were submitted to a 2 (unpacking condition: unpacking vs. control) × 2 (profile: 
improved vs. consistent) mixed ANOVA. The analysis revealed a significant main effect 
of profile, F(1, 103) = 23.48, p < .001, d = 0.72. Participants thought that the improved 
employee invested greater effort over the five years (M = 80.92, SD = 12.76) compared to 
the consistent employee (M = 69.10, SD = 19.68). The main effect of unpacking was not 
significant, F(1, 103) = 0.20, p = .66. Moreover, the interaction effect was not significant, 
F(1, 103) = 0.003, p = .95. Hence, the unpacking manipulation did not attenuate the use 
of improvement as an indicator of perceived effort over the five years.  
Perceptions of the effort that the employees invested in each of the five years 
(obtained from participants in the unpacking condition) are presented in Table 3b. The 
pattern of results indicated that perceived effort progressively increased for the improved 
profile, but it declined for the consistent profile. Effort perceptions were analyzed in a 
2(profile: improved vs. consistent) × 2(year: first vs. fifth) repeated-measures ANOVA. 
The interaction effect was significant, F(1,52) = 27.06, p < .001. For the improved 
profile, perceived effort was greater in the fifth year than in the first year (t(52) = 5.42, p 
< .001); whereas for the consistent profile, perceived effort was lower in the fifth year 
than in the first year (t(52) = -3.01, p = .004). Perceptions of effort investments in the first 
year were slightly, though non-significantly, higher for the consistent than for the 
improved profile, t(52) = -1.55, p = .13. In the final year, however, participants perceived 
greater effort investments by the improved than the consistent employee (t(52) = 4.76, p 
< .001) even though their performance level was identical in that year. 
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Trait effort. Judgments of trait effort (Cronbach’s α = .93 for the improved 
profile and .89 for the consistent profile) were also submitted to a 2 (condition: 
unpacking vs. control) × 2 (profile: improved vs. consistent) mixed ANOVA. Again, 
there was a main effect of profile, F(1, 103) = 70.77, p < .001. Participants rated the 
improved employee higher on effort-related traits (M = 6.17, SD = 0.85) than the 
consistent employee (M = 4.77, SD = 1.33), d = 1.26. The main effect of unpacking was 
not significant, F(1, 103) = 0.58, p = .45, and the interaction effect was also not 
significant, F(1, 103) = 1.75, p = .19. This suggests that the unpacking manipulation did 
not attenuate the reliance on improvement when judging how hardworking the employees 
are.  
Trait competence. The index of trait competence (Cronbach’s α =  .80 for the 
improved profile and .76 for the consistent profile) was submitted to a 2 (condition: 
unpacking vs. control) × 2 (profile: improved vs. consistent) mixed ANOVA. None of the 
effects were significant in this analysis (See Table 3a for mean ratings and standard 
deviations for different types of judgment in this study). 
Deservingness for promotion. We submitted ratings of deservingness for the 
promotion to a 2 (condition: unpacking vs. control) × 2 (profile: improved vs. consistent) 
mixed ANOVA. The pattern of results was similar to that obtained with effort. 
Specifically, participants viewed the improved candidate as more deserving of promotion 
(M = 5.84, SD = 1.01) than the consistent candidate (M = 5.18, SD = 1.48), F(1, 102) = 
12.24, p = .001, d = 0.52. This effect was not moderated by the unpacking manipulation, 
F(1, 102) = 0.12, p = .73. The main effect of unpacking was also not significant, F(1, 
102) = 1.99, p = .16.  
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We also examined responses provided on the slider bar measure of relative 
preference (recoded such that higher numbers indicated greater preference for the 
improved relative to the consistent) profile. Responses were compared to a value of 50, 
which denotes having no preference for one profile over the other. This analysis provided 
additional evidence that participants preferred to award the promotion to the improved 
employee in both the unpacking (M = 61.92, SD = 34.48, t(52) = 2.52, p = .02) and the 
control (M = 61.25, SD = 26.97, t(51) = 3.01, p < .01) conditions. An additional t-test 
indicated that the preference ratings did not differ across the two unpacking conditions, 
t(103) = -0.11, p = .91, d = 0.02. 
Mediation by perceived effort. To examine whether deservingness judgments of 
the profiles were driven by effort perceptions, we followed the procedure recommended 
by Judd, Kenny, and McClelland (2001) for testing mediation in within-subjects designs. 
First, we computed difference scores (improved –consistent) for the measures of 
perceived effort and deservingness. For each participant, we also computed the sum of 
perceived effort ratings of the improved and consistent profiles. For each of the 
unpacking conditions, a regression analysis was conducted with the difference in 
deservingness as the outcome variable, the difference in effort as predictor, and the sum 
of effort ratings as a control variable. The deservingness of the improved employee 
(relative to the consistent employee) was significantly positively related to effort 
perceptions in both the unpacking (B = .07, t(50) = 5.89, p < .001) and the control (B = 
.04, t(48) = 5.12, p < .001) conditions. This finding suggests that perceived effort 
mediated the impact of temporal profile on deservingness judgments. Zero-order 
correlations of the difference scores included in this analysis are presented in Table 3c 
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(Tables 3d and 3e show the correlations for the improved and the consistent profiles, 
respectively). Table 3g presents the detailed results of the mediation by perceived effort. 
Mediation by trait effort. To examine the relationship between deservingness 
and trait judgements, we used the same mediation procedure outlined above. The main 
objective was to test whether judgments of trait effort would drive deservingness ratings, 
when the variations in ability and warmth judgments are controlled for.  First, we 
computed difference scores (improved – consistent) for the trait indices of effort, 
competence, and warmth. Likewise, we computed the sums (improved + consistent) for 
each of the three indices. For each of the unpacking conditions, a regression analysis was 
conducted with the difference in deservingness as the outcome variable and the 
differences on the trait indices as predictors (controlling for the sums for each of the 
indices). The detailed results of this analysis are presented in Table 3h. As hypothesized, 
the difference in trait effort predicted the difference in deservingness in both the 
unpacking (B = 0.76, t(46) = 5.55, p < .001) and the control (B = 0.57, t(44) = 3.97, p < 
.001) conditions, indicating that judgments of trait effort played a mediating role in 
driving deservingness ratings, even when the other types of traits (competence and 
warmth) were controlled for. 
Overall, the results of Study 3 showed that the differences in effort judgments 
between the improved and consistent profiles may have implications for decision-
making. Not only was the improved employee judged to be more hard working and to 
have put more effort, but he was also viewed as more deserving of promotion than the 
consistent employee. Perceptions of the amount of effort invested by the employees in the 
past, as well as judgments of their trait effort, explained the differences in deservingness 
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judgments. The study also showed that unpacking effort judgements did not weaken the 
effect of improvement on effort judgments and deservingness. Taken together, Studies 2 
and 3 suggest that attempts to focus evaluators’ attention on the strengths of non-
improved profiles may not be effective for reducing the use of improvement as a heuristic 
for judging effort in these joint evaluation contexts. These findings attest to the 
robustness of the association between improvement and effort. 
Study 4: Spontaneous Judgements 
When comparing the improved and the consistently-strong profiles in Study 3, 
evaluators perceived greater effort in the improved profile, and hence favoured that 
profile for a promotion opportunity. Of particular note, participants were directly asked to 
report their judgments of effort on the provided rating scales before judging the 
deservingness of the employees for the promotion.  It is possible that participants only 
considered judgments of effort because they were provided with these items to respond 
to, but would evidence of improvement (vs. consistency) in performance spontaneously 
trigger inferences about effort in absence of these items? Addressing this question would 
provide a stronger test of the proposition that improvement and effort are highly 
associated; and that this association underlies the differences in judgments across the two 
profiles of interest. 
In Study 4, we tested whether people spontaneously think of effort when 
advocating someone with improved (versus consistently-strong) performance. To 
examine this question, we showed participants two performance profiles of candidates for 
an employment award: one showing performance that is consistently-high and the other 
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showing performance that improves over time to that high level. Participants were 
randomly assigned to support one of the two candidates, and to provide reasons why that 
candidate should win the award. The question was open-ended and it made no reference 
to effort. We predicted that participants would spontaneously mention effort more 
frequently when supporting the profile of the improved (versus consistently-strong) 
candidate for the award. 
Method 
Participants. One hundred and eleven adults from the United States participated 
in this study (57 male, 51 female, 3 unidentified, Mage = 34.96, SD = 13.07; 14 Asian, 4 
Black/African American, 6 Hispanic or Latino, 82 White, 5 unidentified). They were 
recruited through MTurk and they completed this study online in exchange for $0.50.  
Procedure. Participants were presented with the two employee profiles used in 
Study 1B and Study 3. Again, the peripheral content of the profiles and the location on 
the screen (left versus right side) were counterbalanced across participants. Participants 
were told to imagine that they were part of a selection committee examining the profiles 
of employees who are candidates for an employment award. Participants were then 
randomly assigned to support one of the two profiles; they were told that they should 
convince other committee members that this employee should win the award. 
Specifically, participants received the following instructions: 
“Imagine that you have selected Andrew (John), who has displayed consistent 
(improved) performance, to win this award. Now, imagine that you are trying to 
explain the rationale behind your choice to the rest of the selection committee 
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members. Please support the above decision by explaining why Andrew's 
(John’s) performance pattern makes him more deserving of the award. We are 
interested in all the different reasons that you could think about as you are 
justifying this decision. We would like you to think deeply about these reasons and 
to go beyond describing the performance patterns that are displayed on the graph.” 
Participants were asked to type the reasons that they thought of. Participants were 
also asked to indicate how difficult it was to come up with arguments supporting the 
profile they were assigned (1 = not at all difficult, 7 = very difficult) and to rate how 
convincing they think the arguments that they came up with were (1 = not at all 
convincing, 7 = very convincing). Then, they completed demographic questions.  
Results  
Participants rated the difficulty of coming up with arguments equally for the 
improved (M = 3.07, SD = 1.67) and consistent (M = 3.20, SD = 1.80) profiles, t(107) = 
0.38, p = .71, d = 0.07. They also thought that the arguments that they came up with for 
the improved (M = 5.09, SD = 1.17) and consistent (M = 5.02, SD = 1.33) profiles were 
equally convincing, t(107) = -0.31, p = .76, d = 0.06. 
Participants’ responses were coded by a research assistant who was blind to the 
hypotheses. The research assistant read each of the responses provided by participants 
and indicated whether or not the participant had made reference to effort as a reason why 
the employee should win the award (1 = effort is mentioned, 0 = effort is not mentioned), 
and whether or not they made reference to ability as a reason (1 = ability is mentioned, 0 
= ability is not mentioned). The coder was provided with a list of words and phrases that 
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are synonymous with effort (e.g., hard work, persistence) and ability (e.g., competent, 
talented, smart). Examples of responses where effort was mentioned include: “[Andrew] 
has worked hard from day one and continues every day”, and “[John] has made a 
conscious effort to improve each year”. Examples of responses where ability was 
mentioned include: “[Andrew]’s performance shows his quality of ability... He is stable, 
intelligent and works well under pressure”, and “For [John] to show consistent 
improvement is a strong sign that he is committed, capable, smart and enthusiastic”. 
Overall, the results indicated that a greater proportion of participants mentioned effort 
when supporting the improved employee than when supporting the consistent employee 
(44.6 % vs. 23.6 %), Chi-square [1, N = 111] = 5.44, p = .02, d = 0.45. In contrast, there 
was a tendency to mention ability more frequently when supporting the consistent 
employee than when supporting the improved employee (16.4% vs. 5.4%), but the 
difference was only marginally significant, Chi-square [1, N = 111] = 3.49, p = .06, d = 
0.36 (See Table 4). 
To assess the reliability of the coding scheme, a second rater independently coded 
a sample of 57 responses. The two raters agreed on 86% of responses for effort (Cohen’s 
Kappa = .69, p < .001) and 93% of responses for ability (Cohen’s Kappa = .76, p < .001). 
Study 5: The Role of Ambiguity 
We have characterized people’s tendency to infer effort from evidence of 
improvement as a cognitive heuristic. One hallmark of heuristics is that people tend to 
utilize them to a greater degree in decision contexts that are more ambiguous (Gilovich et 
al., 2002; Kruger et al., 2004; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Note that in previous studies 
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the profiles had considerable ambiguity. For example, participants did not know what a 
typical performance level was in the given contexts and where the targets’ performance 
stood relative to that typical level. The goal of Study 5 is to test whether ambiguity would 
influence people’s reliance on the improvement-effort heuristic. To manipulate 
ambiguity, we created profiles involving a context that was probably unfamiliar to 
participants (sales of electric heating systems) and manipulated whether we provided 
them with a reference point that would help them to interpret the information in the 
profiles; specifically, we presented them with the average level of performance in the 
given domain. We predicted that when the reference point is provided (i.e., lower 
ambiguity), participants would base their judgments on comparisons of performance 
levels to that reference point and would rely less on the improvement-effort heuristic. In 
contrast, when the reference point is not provided (higher ambiguity), participants would 
use improvement as a heuristic for effort as in the previous studies.  
Method 
Participants. The final sample consisted of 120 adults from the United States (62 
male, 54 female, 4 unidentified; Mage = 35.71, SD = 13.1110; 4 Asian, 8 Black/African 
American, 7 Hispanic or Latino, 93 White, 5 other, 3 unidentified). They were recruited 
through MTurk and they completed this study online in exchange for $0.50. Seven other 
participants were excluded for failure on a simple attention check item (See procedure). 
Procedure. Participants were invited to complete an online questionnaire 
examining their opinions and judgments of employee profiles. After completing a consent 
form, participants were presented with the profiles of two sales representatives in a 
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company that sells electric heating systems to home owners. We expected that this would 
be a context that most participants have little familiarity with.  Participants were told that 
the two representatives had joined the company at the same time (five years ago). 
Participants then viewed two graphs displaying the number of electric heating units sold 
by the employees in each of the past five years (see Appendix G). The graphs indicated 
that both employees had sold an equal number of units in the past year (final point on the 
graph: 350 units). One of the employees sold around that number each year since he 
started working at the company, whereas the other sold only 150 units in his first year 
and his annual unit sales increased steadily over time. The two profiles were presented 
side-by-side and the location on the screen (left versus right side) was counterbalanced. 
The names of the sales representatives were also counterbalanced across participants. 
Participants in the high ambiguity condition were not given any further information that 
would assist them with their judgments, whereas participants in the low ambiguity 
condition were told that the average unit sales for representatives at the company was 
around 250 units per year. This information indicates that the consistent employee 
performed above average throughout the years he was employed in the company, 
whereas the improved employee started below average and improved steadily until his 
performance eventually surpassed the average. Participants completed the same 
dependent measures used in Study 3. Specifically, they judged the amount of effort 
invested by the two employees on a slider bar measure, and rated the employees on a set 
of traits that are related to effort, warmth, competence, success, and ambition (identical to 
those used in earlier studies). Participants also rated the positivity of their overall 
impression of the employees (1 = very negative, 7 = very positive). Participants then read 
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that the company is offering a promotion opportunity to one of its sales representatives, 
and that the two employees are the candidates for this promotion. Participants were asked 
to imagine being part of the selection committee and to rate how deserving each 
employee would be of the promotion (1 = not at all deserving, 7 = very deserving). They 
also demonstrated their relative preference by moving a tab on a slider bar (from 0 to 
100) with endpoints indicating a definite preference for each candidate and midpoint 
indicating “no preference”. On the following page, participants read a simple attention 
check question, in which they were asked to select the decision scenario that they were 
instructed to imagine. Participants had three options to choose from: “selecting one of the 
employees to receive an award”, “selecting one of the employees for a promotion”, or “I 
don’t know”. They were excluded if they did not answer correctly. Finally, participants 
reported demographic information. 
Results 
Perceived effort. First, we submitted the perceived effort ratings to a 2 
(ambiguity: high vs. low) × 2 (profile: improved vs. consistent) mixed ANOVA. Only the 
interaction effect was significant, F(1, 84) = 17.44, p < .001. When a reference point was 
not available (high ambiguity), participants thought that the improved sales representative 
invested more effort in his job (M = 82.76, SD = 13.53) compared to the consistent one 
(M = 69.20, SD = 19.44), t(53) = 3.61, p = .001, d = 0.82. In contrast, when the reference 
point was available (low ambiguity condition), participants thought that the improved 
employee invested less effort in the job (M = 73.16, SD = 24.89) compared to the 
consistent employee (M = 86.00, SD = 15.92), t(31) = -2.46, p = .02, d = -0.62. This 
suggests that, when the average employee performance was provided, participants based 
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their judgments of effort on how each of the employees performed in relation to this 
average, rather than relying on improvement as a heuristic for effort. 
Trait effort. Similarly, we submitted the index of trait effort (Cronbach’s α = .94 
for the consistent profile and .96 for the improved profile) to a 2 (ambiguity: high vs. 
low) × 2 (profile: improved vs. consistent) mixed ANOVA. There was a significant main 
effect of ambiguity (F[1, 86] = 7.74, p = .01) whereby participants’ ratings of trait effort 
were higher in the low ambiguity condition (M = 6.01, SD = 0.14) than in the high 
ambiguity condition (M = 5.53, SD = 0.10), d = 4.14. More importantly, the interaction 
effect was significant, F(1, 86) = 40.70, p < .001. In the highly ambiguous condition, 
participants rated the improved employee higher on trait effort (M = 6.20, SD = 0.94) 
compared to the consistent employee (M = 4.86, SD = 1.37), t(55) = 5.87, p < .001, d = 
1.14. In the low ambiguity condition, participants rated the improved employee lower on 
trait effort (M = 5.48, SD = 1.37) compared to the consistent employee (M = 6.54, SD = 
0.80), t(31) = -3.58, p = .001 , d = 0.95.  
Trait competence. The index of trait competence (Cronbach’s α = .75 for the 
consistent profile and .82 for the improved profile) was submitted to a 2 (ambiguity: high 
vs. low) × 2 (profile: improved vs. consistent) mixed ANOVA. Only the main effect of 
ambiguity was significant (F[1, 86] = 10.57, p = .01) indicating that, overall, judgments 
of competence were lower in the high ambiguity condition. This effect was not 
anticipated and it does not speak directly to the main questions of interest in the present 
research. No other effects were significant (See Tables 5a and 5e for mean ratings and 
standard deviations for different types of judgment in this study). 
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Deservingness for promotion. Ratings of deservingness for the promotion were 
also submitted to a 2 (ambiguity: high vs. low) × 2 (profile: improved vs. consistent) 
mixed ANOVA. The interaction effect was significant, F(1, 86) = 11.63, p = .001. In the 
high ambiguity condition, participants rated the improved employee as more deserving of 
promotion (M = 5.98, SD = 0.98) than the consistent employee (M = 5.21, SD = 1.45), 
t(55) = 2.84, p = .01, d = 0.62. In the low ambiguity condition, however, participants 
rated the improved employee as less deserving of promotion (M = 5.66, SD = 1.45) than 
the consistent employee (M = 6.34, SD = 1.00), t(31) = -2.25, p = .03, d = 0.55. Similarly, 
a t-test conducted on the preference ratings (recoded so that higher numbers indicate 
greater preference for the improved profile) revealed a greater preference for the 
improved profile in the highly ambiguous context (M= 59.38, SD = 32.36) than in the less 
ambiguous context (M= 42.34, SD = 30.60), t(86) = -2.42, p = .02, d = 0.55. 
Mediation by perceived effort. We followed the same procedure of testing 
mediation in within-subjects designs (Judd et al., 2001) as in Study 3. We examined 
whether effort perceptions drove the deservingness ratings of the profiles in each of the 
high and low ambiguity contexts. First, we computed difference scores (improved –
consistent) for the measures of deservingness and perceived effort. We also computed the 
sum of the profile ratings (improved + consistent) for the measure of perceived effort. For 
each of the two context conditions, a regression analysis was then conducted with the 
difference in deservingness as the outcome variable, the difference in effort perceptions 
as the predictor, and the sum of the effort ratings as a control variable. The deservingness 
of the improved profile (relative to the consistent profile) was significantly positively 
related to perceived effort in both the high (B = .04, t(51) = 4.96, p < .001) and the low (B 
42 
 
= .03, t(29) = 4.38, p < .001) ambiguity conditions. This indicates that the effect of the 
profiles (improved vs. consistent) on deservingness was mediated by perceptions of effort 
in both conditions. Correlations among the different types of judgments in this study are 
presented in Tables 5b, 5c, and 5d. The mediation by effort perceptions is presented in 
Table 5f. 
Mediation by trait effort. To examine the role of trait judgments in driving 
deservingness ratings, we followed the same procedure of testing mediation as in Study 
3. For each of the context ambiguity conditions, a regression analysis was conducted with 
the difference in deservingness as the outcome variable and the differences between the 
two profile judgments on the three trait indices (effort, competence, and warmth) as 
predictors, controlling for the sums of judgments on each of the three indices (See Table 
5g for the detailed findings of this analysis). Importantly, the deservingness of the 
improved profile (relative to the consistent profile) was significantly positively related to 
the difference in trait effort judgments in both the high (B = 0.67, t(49) = 5.77, p < .001) 
and the low (B = 0.69, t(25) = 3.48, p < .001) ambiguity conditions. In other words, 
judgments of trait effort influenced deservingness ratings, even when the judgments of 
competence and warmth were controlled for in the analyses. 
Study 6: Separate Evaluation Context 
 Studies 1 to 5 provided converging evidence that evaluators perceive greater 
effort in profiles that show improvement over time compared to those that show 
consistent strong performance. Participants appeared to use evidence of improvement as a 
heuristic indicating great effort investment, and this resulted in a relative devaluation of 
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the effort that went into consistent strong performance. Moreover, Studies 3 and 5 
showed that these effort judgements translate into an overall preference for improvement 
over consistent high performance (e.g., in promotion decisions). Similar to other 
heuristic-based judgments, these effects were moderated by ambiguity. Specifically, 
Study 5 showed that participants used improvement as a heuristic indicating effort when 
the decision was highly ambiguous, but not when it was disambiguated by providing a 
meaningful reference point. It is noteworthy that all the studies thus far have compared 
judgments of improvement and consistency in joint-evaluation contexts; the improved 
and consistent profiles were presented side-by-side and were evaluated simultaneously. 
We reasoned that most hiring and recruitment decisions require decision makers to view 
more than one profile and to evaluate them in a joint manner. In Study 6, we extend our 
investigation to separate decision contexts, in which the evaluator is only judging one 
performance record.  Study 6 is essentially designed as a between-participants version of 
Study 5. We test whether the improvement-effort heuristic would be used in a separate 
decision context, and whether the use of the heuristic would be moderated by ambiguity 
in this context.  
Method 
Participants. The final sample consisted of 184 adults from the United States 
(106 male, 72 female, 6 unidentified; Mage = 36.73, SD = 14.16; 10 Asian, 16 
Black/African American, 13 Hispanic or Latino, 136 White, 3 other, 5 unidentified) 
recruited through MTurk. Participants completed this study online in exchange for $0.50. 
Nine participants were excluded for failure on a simple attention check. 
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Procedure. All materials were adapted from those used in Study 5. Participants 
read about the profile of John Thompson, a sales representative who has been working in 
a company selling electric heating systems for five years. The profile included a graph 
depicting the number of electric heating units that John sold each year. Participants were 
assigned to one of four conditions in a 2(ambiguity: high vs. low) × 2(profile: improved 
vs. consistent) between-participants experimental design. As in Study 5, the final point on 
the graph was 350 units, regardless of whether the profile depicted consistency (i.e., 
selling around 350 units every year) or improvement (i.e., starting at 150 units and 
working up to 350). Participants in the low ambiguity condition read that the average 
number of units sold by sales representatives at this company was 250 units per year, 
whereas those in the high ambiguity condition did not read that information. Participants 
completed the same dependent measures used in the previous studies. Specifically, they 
judged how much effort John has invested in the past five years, and they also rated him 
on traits related to effort, warmth, competence, success, and ambition using the same 
scales that were employed in earlier studies. They then rated the positivity of their overall 
impression of John. After that, participants read that John was a candidate for a 
promotion opportunity in the company, and were asked to imagine being part of the 
selection committee. Participants rated John’s deservingness for the promotion (1 = not at 
all deserving, 7 = very deserving), and then completed the attention check question used 
in Study 5 (i.e., selecting the decision scenario they were instructed to imagine). Finally, 
participants completed demographic questions. 
Results 
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Perceived effort. First, participants’ perceptions of the effort invested by the 
employee were compared in a 2 (ambiguity: high vs. low) × 2 (profile: improved vs. 
consistent) ANOVA. The main effect of ambiguity was significant, F(1, 180) = 15.40, p 
< .001, indicating that effort was perceived to be lower in the high (M = 74.86, SD = 
18.62) than in the low (M = 84.33, SD = 15.22) ambiguity condition, d = 0.55. The main 
effect of profile was also significant, F(1, 180) = 23.42, p < .001, indicating that the 
consistent employee was perceived to have invested less effort (M = 73.55, SD = 20.03) 
than the improved employee (M = 85.38, SD = 12.35), d = 0.71. Importantly, the 
interaction effect was also significant, F(1, 180) = 18.21, p < .001. In the more 
ambiguous decision context, the improved employee received higher ratings of perceived 
effort (M = 85.76, SD = 11.59) than the consistent employee (M = 65.02, SD = 18.35), 
t(95) = 6.57, p < .001, d = 1.34. In the less ambiguous condition, however, ratings of 
effort for the improved (M = 84.98, SD = 13.21) and the consistent (M = 83.67, SD = 
17.16) employees were not significantly different, t(85) = 0.40, p = .69, d = 0.09.  
Trait effort. Participants’ perceptions of the employee’s trait effort (Cronbach’s α 
= .96 for the consistent profile and .93 for the improved profile) were compared in a 2 
(ambiguity: high vs. low) × 2 (profile: improved vs. consistent) ANOVA. The main 
effects of ambiguity and of profile were both significant (F[1, 180] = 19.38, p < .001 and 
F[1, 180] = 33.60, p < .001, respectively). Specifically, ratings of trait effort were lower 
in the more ambiguous context (M = 5.27, SD = 1.39) than in the less ambiguous context 
(M = 6.01, SD = 1.06), d = 0.59. Ratings were also lower for the consistent employee (M 
= 5.14, SD = 1.43) than for the improved employee (M = 6.12, SD = 0.89), d = 0.82. The 
ambiguity × profile interaction was also significant, F(1, 180) = 28.67, p < .001. Under a 
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high level of ambiguity, trait effort ratings were lower for the consistent employee (M = 
4.44, SD = 0.15) than for the improved employee (M = 6.20, SD = 0.16), t(95) = -7.49, p 
< .001, d = 1.52. With a lower level of ambiguity, however, the consistent (M = 5.98, SD 
= 0.16) and the improved (M = 6.05, SD = 0.16) profiles did not differ significantly on 
trait effort judgments, t(85) = -0.05, p = .96, d = 0.44.  
Trait competence. We also compared perceptions of trait competence 
(Cronbach’s α = .94 for the consistent profile and .81 for the improved profile) in a 2 
(ambiguity: high vs. low) × 2 (profile: improved vs. consistent) ANOVA. Similar to 
Study 5, the main effect of ambiguity was significant (F[1, 180] = 5.80, p = .017), 
indicating that ratings of competence were lower in the more ambiguous context (M = 
5.51, SD = 0.98) than in the less ambiguous context (M = 5.87, SD = 1.01), d = 0.36. This 
effect does not speak directly to the main questions of interest in the present research. 
Thus, it will not be discussed further. The main effect of profile was significant in this 
study (F[1, 180] = 7.99, p = .005), indicating that ratings of competence were lower for 
the consistent employee (M = 5.47, SD = 1.10) than for the improved employee (M = 
5.90, SD = 0.86), d = 0.43. The ambiguity × profile interaction was also significant, F(1, 
180) = 7.58, p = .007. Under a high level of ambiguity, trait competence ratings were 
lower for the consistent employee (M = 5.14, SD = 1.06) than for the improved employee 
(M = 5.93, SD = 0.70), t(95) = 4.30, p < .001, d = 0.86. In the less ambiguous decision 
context, trait competence ratings were similar for the consistent (M = 5.87, SD = 1.01) 
and the improved (M = 5.88, SD = 0.99) profiles, t(85) = 0.05, p = .81, d = 0.01. Hence, 
in this study, the pattern of results for trait competence was similar to that of trait effort. 
The main effect of profile indicating greater competence ratings for the improved profile 
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was a surprising finding. It is possible that this finding may be the result of the separate 
evaluation mode employed in this study. Clearly, further research is needed to better 
understand this finding. Table 6a shows the mean ratings and standard deviations for 
different types of judgment in this study and Table 6d shows the mean ratings and 
standard deviations for the individual items that form the indices of trait effort and trait 
competence.  
Deservingness for promotion. Ratings of deservingness for promotion were 
compared in a 2 (ambiguity: high vs. low) × 2 (profile: improved vs. consistent) 
ANOVA. Overall, ratings of deservingness were lower in the high (M = 5.31, SD = 1.37) 
than in the low (M = 6.06, SD = 0.99) ambiguity condition, F(1, 180) = 21.62, p < .001, d 
= 0.62. The consistent employee was viewed as less deserving of promotion (M = 5.12, 
SD = 1.41) than the improved employee (M = 6.23, SD = 0.75), F(1, 180) = 49.11, p < 
.001, d = 0.98. More importantly, the ambiguity × profile interaction was significant, F(1, 
180) = 22.36, p < .001. In the more ambiguous context, participants viewed the consistent 
employee to be less deserving of promotion (M = 4.47, SD = 1.24) than the improved 
employee (M = 6.24, SD = 0.79), t(95) = 8.27, p < .001, d = 1.68. In the less ambiguous 
context, the consistent and the improved profiles were viewed as equally deserving of 
promotion (M = 5.88, SD = 0.71 and M = 6.23, SD = 1.20, respectively), t(85) = 1.63, p = 
.11, d = 0.35. 
Mediation by effort perceptions. We tested a moderated mediation model 
(Muller, Judd, & Yzerbyt, 2005; Preacher, Rucker, & Hayes, 2007) to examine whether 
the extent to which the indirect effect of profile on deservingness judgments (as mediated 
by effort perceptions) was moderated by the ambiguity of the context. We expected 
48 
 
participants to base their decisions on the intuitive improvement-effort association when 
the decision context was ambiguous, but not when the decision context was 
disambiguated by providing additional diagnostic information. Hence, we expected the 
mediation (of profile condition on deservingness judgments) by effort perceptions to be 
significant in the high ambiguity condition, but not in the low ambiguity condition. We 
followed the analytical procedure outlined in Preacher et al. (2007). First, effort 
perceptions were mean-centered and both decision context and profile were effect-coded 
(low ambiguity = -1, high ambiguity = 1; consistent profile = -1, improved profile = 1). 
We then examined the moderated mediation model using the SPSS macro designed by 
Preacher et al. (2007; Model 2). The analyses showed that the ambiguity × profile 
interaction was a significant predictor of effort perceptions, B = 4.86, t(180) = 4.27, p < 
.001. When controlling for ambiguity, profile, and their interaction, effort perceptions 
significantly predicted deservingness judgments, B = 0.05, t(179) =13.47, p < .001 (See 
Figure 1 for the overall moderated mediation results). The analysis also included the 
conditional indirect effect of profile on deservingness (as mediated by effort perceptions) 
within each of the two ambiguity conditions.  
To further understand these conditional effects, we also examined the mediation 
pattern within each of the ambiguity conditions. In the high ambiguity condition, a 
bootstrapping analysis with 5,000 samples indicated that the indirect effect was 
significant (the 95% bias corrected and accelerated CI for the indirect effect was 0.34 to 
0.67) suggesting that deservingness judgments were driven by effort perceptions in this 
condition. Specifically, improvement (vs. consistency) was associated with higher effort 
perceptions (B = 10.37, t(96) = 6.57, p < .001), which were, in turn, associated with 
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higher deservingness for promotion (controlling for the effect of improvement; B= 0.05, 
t(96) = 10.26, p < .001). Figure 2 summarizes the mediation pattern in the high ambiguity 
condition. As mentioned earlier, the total effect of profile on deservingness was not 
significant in the low ambiguity condition (B = .34, t(86) = 1.63, p = .11). Likewise, the 
indirect effect through effort perceptions was not significant (the 95% bias corrected and 
accelerated CI for the indirect effect was -0.10 to 0.22), indicating that deservingness 
judgments of the two profiles were not driven by effort perceptions in this condition. 
Figure 3 shows the results of the mediation analysis in the low ambiguity condition.  
We also examined the zero-order correlations among the other types of judgments 
in this study (e.g., trait ability, trait effort, and trait warmth). Overall, the different types 
of judgments were positively correlated with one another such that favorable ratings on 
one aspect were associated with favorable ratings on all the other aspects. We found this 
pattern of results for the ratings of both the improved and consistent profiles (See Tables 
6b and 6c, respectively). 
Mediation by trait effort. We also tested whether the indirect effect of profile on 
deservingness judgments was mediated by trait effort, but only in the highly ambiguous 
decision context. We used a similar moderated mediation model as that outlined above 
(based on the guidelines by Preacher et al., 2007), and included other trait judgments 
(ability and warmth) as covariates in the analyses. The ambiguity × profile interaction 
significantly predicted trait effort, B = 0.22, t(178) = 3.80, p < .001, which in turn 
predicted deservingness judgments, B = 0.60, t(177) = 8.28, p < .001 (controlling for the 
effects of ambiguity and profile, as well as trait warmth and trait competence; See Figure 
4 for the overall moderated mediation results).  
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To further understand these conditional effects, we also examined the mediation 
by trait effort within the two ambiguity conditions, controlling for judgments of trait 
warmth and trait competence. In the high ambiguity context, the indirect effect through 
trait effort was significant (the 95% bias corrected and accelerated CI for the indirect 
effect was 0.24 to 0.59), indicating that the difference in trait effort judgments drove the 
deservingness judgments of the two profiles (See Figure 5). The improved profile 
received higher ratings of trait effort than the consistent profile (B =0.49, t(93) = 5.42, p 
< .001),  and this in turn influenced the relative deservingness judgments of the two 
profiles (B =0.76, t(92) = 7.32, p < .001). In the low ambiguity condition, the indirect 
effect through trait effort was not significant (the 95% bias corrected and accelerated CI 
for the indirect effect was -0.01 to 0.10), indicating that trait effort judgments were not a 
significant mediator in this condition (See Figure 6).   The improved and the consistent 
profiles were rated similarly on trait effort (B =0.06, t(83) = 0.75, p = .46). However, 
when controlling for the effect of profile in this condition, trait effort judgments 
significantly predicted deservingness judgments (B =0.34, t(82) = 3.01, p < .01). 
In conclusion, Study 6 provides a general replication of our findings in a separate 
evaluation context. The results indicated that an improved sales representative was 
judged as more hardworking and was perceived to have invested greater effort than a 
consistently-strong sales representative, but only when the decision context was 
considerably ambiguous. When the decision context was disambiguated, the two profiles 
were rated equally on effort perceptions and trait effort.  Consequently, the improved 
sales representative was viewed as more deserving of the promotion in the high 
ambiguity condition, but the two profiles were seen as equally deserving in the low 
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ambiguity condition. A moderated mediation analysis indicated that deservingness 
judgments were driven by effort perceptions in the high ambiguity condition but not in 
the low ambiguity condition. Similarly, another analysis indicated that deservingness 
judgments were driven by trait effort perceptions in the high -but not in the low- 
ambiguity condition, even when other types of traits (ability and warmth) were controlled 
for. These findings provide further support to our rationale: In a context that is relatively 
ambiguous, participants based their deservingness judgments on the intuitive association 
between improvement and effort, whereas in the less ambiguous context, participants’ 
decisions were influenced by the additional diagnostic information that was provided.  
Study 7: Meta-Analyses 
The current set of studies provided converging evidence that, in contexts that are 
considerably ambiguous, evaluators perceive greater effort in profiles that show 
improvement over time compared to those that show consistent strong performance. 
These judgments translate into an overall preference for improved profiles in various 
decision contexts. The findings pertaining to competence judgments were mixed and 
were less conclusive. In most studies, participants viewed the improved and consistent 
targets to be equivalent in terms of their competence. However, in some cases (Study 1A; 
Study 2), the consistent target was viewed as more competent than the improved target. 
There was also one case (Study 6, high ambiguity condition) in which judgments of 
competence followed the same pattern as effort judgments, whereby the improved 
candidate was viewed as more competent than the consistent candidate.  In order to 
understand the effects pertaining to judgments of competence and to assess the overall 
strength of the effects in the present set of studies, we conducted a series of meta-
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analyses. The analyses examined the differences between the improved and consistent 
profiles on: (a) effort perceptions, (b) trait effort, (c) trait competence, and (d) 
deservingness judgments.  
Method 
The meta-analyses focused on conditions in which the two profiles were 
evaluated in absence of any additional manipulation procedures. Hence, the analyses 
included the findings from Studies 1A-1C, the control conditions in Studies 2 and 3, and 
the high ambiguity condition in Studies 5 and 6 (i.e., a total of seven samples). First, in 
each of the samples, we computed the standardized mean difference between the 
improved and the consistent profiles (Cohen’s d) on each of: (a) effort perceptions, (b) 
trait effort, (c) trait competence, and (d) deservingness judgments (where applicable) 
using  the program Comprehensive Meta-Analysis (Version 2; Borenstein, Hedges, 
Higgins, & Rothstein, 2005). We then used the same program to conduct meta-analyses 
using a random effects model. The analyses were based on the effect sizes obtained 
(Cohen’s d) and the corresponding standard errors. For each of the four dependent 
measures outlined above, we first ran the analysis including all seven samples to examine 
the overall effects. Then, we re-ran each of the analyses without the sample obtained 
from Study 6 (separate evaluation mode) in order to focus more closely on the effects 
obtained in joint evaluation contexts. 
Results 
 Perceived effort. The overall effect size for the difference in effort perceptions 
between the improved and the consistent profiles was large, Cohen’s d = 0.90 (95% CI 
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[0.61, 1.18]), z  = 6.19, p  < .001. As expected, effort perceptions were higher for the 
improved than for the consistent profiles. In studies with a joint evaluation design, the 
effect size was still large and in the same direction, Cohen’s d = 0.82 (95% CI [0.53, 
1.12]), z = 5.47, p < .001. Appendix H includes forest plots of the analyses conducted 
with all seven samples. 
 Trait effort. Overall, the effect size for the difference between the two profiles on 
trait effort judgments was large, Cohen’s d = 1.05 (95% CI [0.85, 1.26]), z = 10.22, p < 
.001. Improved profiles were rated higher on trait effort than consistent profiles. In 
studies with a joint evaluation design, the effect size was still large and in the same 
direction, Cohen’s d = 0.99 (95% CI [0.82, 1.16]), z = 11. 41, p < .001. 
Trait competence. Overall, the effect size for the difference between the two 
profiles on trait competence judgments was very small, Cohen’s d = -0.02 (95% CI [-
0.29, 0.24]), z = -0.18, p = .86. When excluding the sample from Study 6, the effect size 
remained small, Cohen’s d = -0.14 (95% CI [-0.36, 0.08]), z = -1.25, p = .21. This 
indicated only a slight and non-significant tendency for the consistent profile to be rated 
higher than the improved profile in terms of competence. 
Deservingness. The decision scenarios (including judgments of deservingness for 
various opportunities) were only presented in Studies 3, 5, and 6. Therefore, the meta-
analyses on deservingness judgments only included data from these three samples.  The 
overall effect size for the difference between the profiles on deservingness judgments was 
large, Cohen’s d = 0.93 (95% CI [0.24, 1.61]), z = 2.65, p = .01. However, in studies with 
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a joint evaluation design, the effect size was moderate, Cohen’s d = 0.57 (95% CI [0.29, 
0.84]), z = 4.07, p < .001. 
General Discussion 
In this research project, we proposed that people use improvement as a heuristic 
for judging effort, and hence devalue the amount of effort underlying superior 
performance profiles that show no evidence of improvement. We tested this proposition 
in six empirical studies comparing judgments and preferences of an improved 
performance profile versus a consistently-strong performance profile with identical final 
performance. We examined profiles of students (Study 1A), software developers (Studies 
1B, 2, 3, and 4), course instructors (Study 1C), and sales representatives (Studies 5 and 
6). Our studies showed that evaluators perceived greater effort investments in improved 
than in consistently-strong performance profiles, particularly when the decision context 
was relatively ambiguous. Likewise, those who have improved profiles were viewed as 
having a more hardworking character than those with consistent profiles. Consequently, 
evaluators thought that individuals with improved profiles were more deserving than ones 
with consistent profiles of job promotions (Studies 3, 5, and 6). These patterns of results 
were restricted to decision contexts that were relatively ambiguous. Presenting additional 
diagnostic information eliminated (Study 6) or even reversed (Study 5) the preference for 
the improved candidate over the consistent candidate.  
Our studies further demonstrated that highlighting strengths of the consistent 
profile was not sufficient to boost perceptions of the effort underlying consistent strong 
performance relative to improved performance (Studies 2 and 3). These findings attest to 
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the robustness of the association between improvement and effort. Some may wonder 
why the focus on average performance in Study 2 or the unpacking of effort in Study 3 
did not attenuate the reliance on improvement as a heuristic, whereas the ambiguity 
manipulation in Studies 5 and 6 did. It is important to note that in the low ambiguity 
condition in the latter studies, participants were provided with additional diagnostic 
information that can override their reliance on the intuitive improvement-effort 
association (i.e., trigger System 2 reasoning). In contrast, the unpacking manipulation 
used in Study 3 and the average focus condition in Study 2 did not provide any additional 
information. Instead, these procedures simply provided participants with opportunities to 
attend to some of the existing strengths of the consistent profile (e.g., higher cumulative 
average or higher performance level at the start). The finding that these procedures did 
not eliminate the reliance on improvement as a heuristic for effort is consistent with 
research on other heuristics in which incentives to devote full cognitive resources to the 
judgment at hand did not eliminate the biases caused by the use of heuristics (Gilovich et 
al., 2002).  
Theoretical Implications 
As mentioned earlier, most of the research investigating preferences for 
improvement versus consistency focused on evaluations pertaining to the self. The 
present research contributes to recent lines of work examining evaluations of 
intertemporal trends in others (e.g., El Gamal & Buehler, 2014; Pettit et al., 2013). One 
novel aspect that we introduced is the examination of effort perceptions as a potential 
mediator for these preferences. Specifically, we show that improvement can enhance 
perceptions of effort investments, which can in turn drive decision-makers’ preferences. 
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Another novel aspect is the introduction of decision context ambiguity as a potential 
moderator of evaluations and decisions concerning improved versus consistent 
performance profiles; improved profiles were preferred over consistent profiles, so long 
as the decision context was considerably ambiguous.  
The current research also contributes to a growing body of literature that 
compares and contrasts decisions made under joint versus separate decision modes (for a 
review, see Hsee, Loewenstein, Blount, & Bazerman, 1999). According to this literature, 
there are some important differences between joint and separate evaluations. Joint 
evaluations provide more information to refer to than separate evaluations. Under some 
circumstances, joint evaluations can reduce the degree to which intuitive System 1 
thinking guides evaluators’ overt decisions. Not surprisingly, then, switching from a 
separate evaluation mode to a joint evaluation mode can influence preferences, and can 
sometimes even lead to preference reversals (e.g., Bohnet, van Greene, & Bazerman, 
2012; Hsee et al., 1999). For example, recent research showed that gender biases in hiring 
are accentuated in separate evaluation contexts, and can be eliminated when candidate 
profiles are evaluated jointly (Bohnet et al., 2012). In that context, participants seem to 
have relied more on intuitive System 1 thinking in the separate evaluation mode than in 
the joint evaluation mode. Interestingly, however, our research demonstrated the use of 
improvement as a heuristic for effort under both joint (Studies 1 to 5) and separate (Study 
6) evaluation modes.  As mentioned earlier, under both  modes of evaluation, participants 
rated perceived and trait effort higher in an improved than in a consistently-strong 
performance profile, but only when the decision context was highly ambiguous.  
Nevertheless, our findings reveal some minor differences across Studies 5 and 6. For 
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example, introducing the low ambiguity condition simply eliminated the difference in 
preferences between the improved and consistent profiles in the separate evaluation mode 
(Study 6), but it lead to a significant reversal in preferences when the profiles were jointly 
evaluated in Study 5. Moreover, the performance patterns depicted in the two profiles 
(improved vs. consistent) played a greater role in determining evaluations of competence 
in Study 6 where the profiles were evaluated separately, but not when the same profiles 
were jointly evaluated in Study 5. Moreover, the meta-analyses suggested that some of 
the differences between the two profiles may be stronger in separate than in joint 
evaluation contexts. Future research can directly manipulate evaluation mode (joint vs. 
separate) within one experimental study to provide a more systematic examination of the 
similarities and differences in judgments of effort, competence, and general preferences 
under the two evaluation modes. 
The present research also contributes to our understanding of the nature, 
antecedents and consequences of effort judgements. Although, traditionally, effort has 
been conceptualized as a changeable type of attribution, some researchers have 
acknowledged that, at times, it can also be thought of as a stable trait (Jones, 1989; 
Weiner et al., 1972). In the current research, we included measures of trait effort (being 
hardworking, persistent, etc.) as well as measures of perceived state effort (the amount of 
effort that one has invested in a specific time period). Improvement (vs. consistency) was 
associated with more favourable evaluations on both types of measures; evaluators 
thought that improved targets have put in more effort during the work period covered in 
their performance record and also judged them to be more hardworking. Future research 
can further explore and identify other contexts in which judgments of the changeable and 
58 
 
stable components of effort would converge (as in the present research), as well as 
contexts in which they would diverge from one another.  
Classic research on attributions (e.g., Heider, 1958; Jones, 1989) also suggests 
that there is a trade-off between effort and ability. According to that line of research, 
when performance is held constant, one would expect greater attributions of effort to be 
associated with lower attributions of ability (and vice versa). In the current set of studies, 
we assessed perceptions of competence (i.e., ability) as well as effort to examine whether 
such trade-offs would be applicable. The findings pertaining to ability were mixed.  
Overall, the meta-analysis suggested that the difference in competence judgments 
between the improved and the consistent profiles were very small and non-significant. In 
other words, evaluators inferred higher effort, but not necessarily lower ability, in the 
improved profile relative to the consistent profile. This is remarkable given that the 
consistent profile, which was rated lower on effort but was not always rated higher on 
ability, had always demonstrated superior overall performance than the corresponding 
improved performance profile. Thus, our studies employed a conservative test of the 
potential trade-off between effort and ability judgments. The findings suggest that these 
trade-offs may not be applicable across all contexts.  
Practical Implications  
The types of judgments and decisions explored in the current research are 
applicable to real world decisions made in various institutions including companies, 
universities, etc. In these settings, patterns of performance tend to be tracked and are 
often made accessible for evaluation purposes, whereas information about effort 
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investments tends to be less accessible. Hence, a variety of decisions (e.g., hiring, 
promotions, selecting among candidates for awards, etc.) can be highly susceptible to the 
biases introduced by a reliance on improvement as a heuristic for effort. The findings of 
the current studies provide decision-makers, such as managers, coaches, and academics 
with useful insights that can enable them to make informed decisions when selecting 
among candidates with varied performance records. Knowing about the tendency to 
intuitively associate effort with improvement may alert decision-makers to any biases 
that this association may introduce. This may encourage them to deliberate more 
carefully about decisions that are susceptible to the influence of these biases and to seek 
other diagnostic information (over and above records of performance) pertaining to the 
judgment at hand. Moreover, Studies 5 and 6 suggest that one way of eliminating biases 
could be providing clear reference points that decision makers can rely on, such as 
average performance levels within the relevant context. The kinds of judgments 
examined in the current research are applicable to joint evaluations, where multiple 
profiles are evaluated at once (e.g., a manager choosing among a set of applicants), and 
also to separate evaluation modes, where one profile is evaluated on its own (e.g., 
deciding whether one individual should be promoted or not).  
The present research can also provide useful insights to job applicants and 
students, who seek to present their own records in a favorable manner. It suggests that 
highlighting areas in which one has improved may lead others to view them as 
hardworking, and to subsequently choose them for various opportunities. The research 
also suggests that, in absence of improvement, strong records may still lead to an 
inference of relatively low effort investments (compared to cases where improvement is 
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evident). Hence, candidates whose records do not show clear improvement may need to 
highlight their effort investments and hard work in their profiles. Likewise, reference 
letter writers may need to highlight information pertaining to hard work and effort when 
supporting candidates whose records do not show clear evidence of improvement. One 
caveat, however, is the possibility that an emphasis on effort may activate inferences of 
lower ability in some contexts. More empirical research is needed to directly examine 
when and why highlighting effort investments could be an effective strategy, and to 
understand conditions in which this strategy may backfire. 
Directions for Future Research 
Our research examined ambiguity as a moderator for the use of improvement as a 
heuristic for effort. It also included a preliminary investigation of other variables that 
could potentially play a moderating role in these judgments including gender, ethnic 
background, lay theories, holistic thinking tendencies, and experience with hiring 
decisions (See Appendix B). Future research could examine these factors further and 
determine other factors that may moderate the use of the improvement as a heuristic for 
judging effort, including individual differences that vary among evaluators as well as 
features of the judgment task. Some individuals may be more likely to rely on this 
heuristic than others. For example, people who endorse the view that effort and outcomes 
are strongly linked (Schrift, Kivetz, & Netzer, 2015) may be more likely to use 
improvement in performance as an indicator of effort investments. In addition, people 
may have different lay beliefs and expectations about how performance should unfold 
over the course of one’s career; having a greater expectation of improvement could 
moderate their judgments of improved versus consistent profiles. Cross-cultural 
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differences may also influence these types of judgments because different cultures tend to 
perceive change in different ways (Ji, Nisbett, & Su, 2001). It is also possible that the 
strong association between effort and improvement may be a Western notion that does 
not apply in other cultural contexts. Another potential moderator that can be explored in 
future research is the evaluators’ level of expertise. Future research can compare 
judgments of effort made by experienced managers/recruiters versus individuals with 
lower levels of expertise in hiring and promotion decisions. In the current set of studies, 
participants were undergraduate students (who likely had very little experience with these 
decisions) as well as adults recruited through MTurk. Some of the participants from 
MTurk had some previous experience with hiring and recruitment decisions, but this 
experience did not seem to change their pattern of judgments (See Appendix B for more 
details). Future research can systematically examine the extent to which reliance on the 
heuristic judgments that we found in the current set of studies would be reduced in 
individuals who have substantial experience in hiring and recruitment decisions. 
Features of the judgment task can also moderate the use of improvement as a 
heuristic for effort. For example, the perception of whether or not the targets being 
evaluated have room for improvement may present boundary conditions to the patterns of 
judgments found in the present research. When there is greater room for improvement, 
participants may think that a consistent candidate has the opportunity to improve but is 
not working hard enough to attain that improvement. When there is no room for 
improvement (e.g., consistently performing at the maximum performance level), 
however, participants may not devalue the amount of effort invested by a consistent 
performer. In most of the current studies, there was little room for improvement given 
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that the final performance point (which was controlled across the improved and 
consistent profiles) was only slightly lower than the maximum point on the scale. In the 
final studies, sales figures did not include a natural maximum level, making it less clear 
to judge whether there was room for improvement or not (Studies 5 and 6). Future 
research can measure or experimentally manipulate perceptions of the possibility of 
improvement to examine its influence on judgments in a systematic manner.  
Researchers can also examine variables that moderate the translation of effort 
perceptions into favorable judgments. In some contexts, such as judgments of artists, 
natural talent and ability may be particularly valued over effort. Indeed, research by Tsay 
and Banaji (2011) shows that participants’ decisions among musicians reflected a 
preference for naturals over strivers. In such contexts, it is possible that evidence of 
improvement may not be favored over consistency, because effort inferences are not 
particularly favoured in decisions made in this domain. Similarly, research by Murphy 
and Dweck (2009) suggests that organizations may have shared cultures that view 
intelligence as either malleable (incremental theory) or fixed (entity theory). Applicants 
to organizations that endorse incremental theories of intelligence tend to highlight their 
motivation, growth, and improvement; and decision-makers in these organizations tend to 
base their judgments on these factors. In contrast, applicants to organizations that endorse 
entity theories of intelligence tend to highlight their intellectual abilities and skills; and 
evaluators tend to base their decisions on these factors (Murphy & Dweck, 2009). It is 
possible that organizational lay theories may also influence whether perceptions of 
greater effort investments would translate into favorable judgments by decision-makers in 
these organizations or not.  
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Future research could also examine how other intertemporal trends and patterns 
may influence effort perceptions and subsequent judgments. For example, how would 
people evaluate a decline in performance over time, compared to the profiles presented in 
the current research? In contrast to improvement which tends to be associated with high 
effort investments, any evidence of decline may be associated with perceptions of low 
effort investments (irrespective of absolute performance level). Hence, it is possible that 
people would view any decline in performance to reflect very little effort investments, 
even when compared to other profiles that have lower average performance but no 
evidence of decline. Exploring this proposition would enable us to examine whether the 
heuristic judgment explored in the present set of studies is a specific unique association 
between improvement and effort; or whether it reflects a broader association between 
effort and performance trends. Future research can also examine how judgments of effort 
are formed with performance that does not follow a particular linear trend (i.e., random or 
non-linear changes in performance).   
 Last but not least, future research could also assess the mental association 
between effort and improvement at a more basic level, and investigate the degree to 
which this association tends to be automatically activated based on features of the 
judgment task. Future research can also explore whether patterns such as consistency and 
decline are associated with concepts related to low effort (e.g., slacking, laziness). To 
examine these questions, researchers can use simple methods such as asking participants 
to generate close associates of the target concepts from memory and examining if 
concepts related to high exertion of effort would be generated more frequently in 
response to improvement and whether concepts related to low levels of effort would be 
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generated more frequently in response to stable or declining performance. They can also 
employ response time measures such as the Implicit Associations Test (Greenwald, 
McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998) or investigate whether systematic memory biases would 
automatically emerge as a result of the supposed conceptual associations. For example, 
would participants be more likely to erroneously think that they were exposed to direct 
mentions of effort after reading about improved (vs. consistent or declining) 
performance? Exploring these questions would enhance our understanding of the 
association between effort and improvement, and enable us to identify contexts in which 
it can bias overt judgments. 
Concluding Remarks 
 People rely on mental shortcuts frequently and ubiquitously. Using improvement 
to judge effort is one appealing heuristic that people may employ in a variety of 
performance-related domains. One potential downside of relying on this heuristic is 
devaluing the amount of effort invested by strong performers if they show no evidence of 
improvement. Understanding when and why this heuristic is employed provides valuable 
insights that can help managers, academics, and coaches in making well-informed 
decisions. 
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Endnotes 
1 
In each study, we included additional measures that are beyond the scope of this 
thesis research. Studies 1A, 1B, 1C, and 2 were exploratory studies, in which some 
additional measures were presented before the measures reported in the present thesis 
research. These additional measures examined participants’ evaluation of the targets’ 
performance, future potential, and overall preferences in specific scenarios. It is possible 
that the presentation of these measures may have influenced participants’ judgments of 
the variables that we are interested in. However, it is noteworthy that the basic effect 
reported in Studies 1A, 1B, and 1C (i.e., perceptions of greater effort in an improved 
versus consistently strong profile) is a robust effect that has been replicated several times 
across a variety of contexts. In the rest of the studies (Studies 3, 4, 5, and 6), the measures 
reported in the present thesis research (effort perceptions, trait effort, trait warmth, trait 
competence, success, ambition, positivity of impression, and overall preferences in 
scenarios) were presented at the beginning of the experimental session before any 
additional measures were presented. 
2 
At the end of each study, we included a set of individual difference scales. For 
example, some studies included the analysis-holism scale (Choi, Koo, & Choi, 2007) 
and/or measures of lay theories of changeability in personality and intelligence (Dweck & 
Leggett, 1988). We examined whether these variables moderated the main findings of the 
current studies. We also explored other potential moderators, such as gender and ethnic 
background. The results of these analyses are summarized in Appendix B. 
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Table 1a 
Evaluations of Improved and Consistent Profiles in Study 1 
    Improved Consistent  
Study 
1A 
Student 
Profiles 
Perceived effort M 6.22 5.81 p = .05 
 SD 0.97 1.21  
 N 72 72  
 Trait effort M 6.44 5.96 p = .001 
   SD 0.64 0.88  
   N 73 73  
  Trait competence M 6.09 6.47 p = .001 
   SD 0.82 0.66  
   N 73 73  
  Trait warmth M 5.60 5.15 p = .01 
   SD 0.85 1.14  
   N 73 73  
  Positivity of impression M 6.06 6.85 p = .15 
  SD 0.92 0.97  
   N 72 72  
Study 
1B 
Employee 
Profiles 
Perceived effort  M 6.26 5.20 p < .001 
SD 0.91 1.12  
N 76 76  
Trait effort M 6.32 5.23 p < .001 
 SD 0.85 1.13  
 N 77 77  
73 
 
  Trait competence M 6.07 5.98 p = .35 
   SD 0.92 0.92  
   N 77 77  
  Trait warmth M 5.30 5.03 p < .01 
   SD 1.10 0.95  
   N 77 77  
  Positivity of impression M 5.94 5.42 p < .001 
  SD 1.08 1.13  
  N 77 77  
Study 
1C 
Instructor 
Profiles 
Perceived effort M 6.13 4.81 p < .001 
 SD 0.88 1.17  
 N 104 104  
Trait effort M 6.21 5.17 p < .001 
 SD 0.77 1.02  
 N 103 103  
  Trait competence M 5.89 5.88 p = .90 
   SD 0.86 0.88  
   N 103 103  
  Trait warmth M 5.32 5.45 p = .19 
   SD 0.91 0.81  
   N 103 103  
  Positivity of impression M 5.39 5.55 p = .24 
  SD 1.14 1.06  
  N 103 103  
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Table 1b  
Correlations among Judgments in Study 1 
 Study 1A: Student Profiles  Study 1B: Employee Profiles  Study 1C: Rate My Professor 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Perceived effort (1)  
.70*** .49*** -.22† .20† 
  
.63*** .30** .37** .48*** 
  
.62*** .48*** .32** .44*** 
Trait effort (2)   
.42*** -.22† .14 
   
.27* .19† .58*** 
   
.53*** .26** .38*** 
Trait competence (3)    
-.27* .13 
    
.29* .45*** 
    
.53*** .63*** 
Trait warmth (4)     
.48*** 
     .13      .72*** 
Positivity of impression (5)                  
Note. The correlations reported here were computed with difference scores (improved –consistent) for each type of judgment. † p < .10, * p < .05, 
** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
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Table 1c 
Correlations among Judgments for Each of the Improved Profiles in Study 1 
 Study 1A: Student Profiles  Study 1B: Employee Profiles  Study 1C: Rate My Professor 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Perceived effort (1)  .61*** .39** .11 .34**   .76*** .67*** .51*** .54***   .57*** .45*** .43*** .41*** 
Trait effort (2)   .56*** .14 .38**    .75*** .48*** .72***    .64*** .52*** .47*** 
Trait competence (3)    .22† .51***     .51*** .73***     .54*** .50*** 
Trait warmth (4)     .47***      .47***      .73*** 
Positivity of impression (5)                  
Note. † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
 
  
76 
 
Table 1d 
Correlations among Judgments for Each of the Consistent Profiles in Study 1 
 Study 1A: Student Profiles  Study 1B: Employee Profiles  Study 1C: Rate My Professor 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Perceived effort (1)  .63*** .35** -.12 .21†   .63*** .44*** .27* .47***   .60*** .48*** .52*** .45*** 
Trait effort (2)   .40*** .08 .29*    .59*** .53*** .65***    .64*** .55*** .59*** 
Trait competence (3)    .27* .20†     .41*** .65***     .64*** .59*** 
Trait warmth (4)     .60***      .49***      .65*** 
Positivity of impression (5)                  
Note. † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.
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Table 1e 
Trait Judgments of Improved and Consistent Profiles in Study 1 
    Improved Consistent  
Study 1A Student 
Profiles 
Hardworking M 6.51 6.00 p < .01 
 SD 0.77 1.05  
 N 73 73  
  Motivated M 6.64 5.88 p < .001 
   SD 0.65 1.08  
   N 73 73  
  Persistent M 6.01 6.10 p = .73 
   SD 1.31 1.24  
   N 72 72  
  Determined M 6.59 5.89 p < .001 
   SD 0.81 0.95  
   N 73 73  
  Competent M 6.24 6.43 p = .08 
   SD 1.00 0.87  
   N 72 72  
  Intelligent M 6.00 6.54 p < .001 
   SD 0.92 0.65  
   N 72 72  
  Smart M 6.01 6.44 p < .001 
   SD 1.06 0.93  
   N 73 73  
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  Trait effort M 6.44 5.96 p = .001 
   SD 0.64 0.88  
   N 73 73  
  Trait competence M 6.09 6.47 p = .001 
   SD 0.82 0.66  
   N 73 73  
  Successful M 6.48 6.49 p = .88 
   SD 0.78 0.72  
   N 69 69  
  Ambitious M 6.49 5.60 p < .001 
   SD 0.80 1.32  
   N 72 72  
Study 1B Employee 
Profiles 
Hardworking 
 
M 6.36 5.57 p < .001 
SD 0.97 1.08  
N 75 75  
Motivated 
 
M 6.36 4.87 p < .001 
 SD 0.95 1.29  
 N 76 76  
  Persistent M 6.23 5.30 p < .001 
   SD 0.90 1.34  
   N 77 77  
  Determined M 6.32 5.19 p < .001 
   SD 0.99 1.27  
   N 77 77  
  Competent M 6.08 6.05 p = .83 
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   SD 1.03 1.00  
  N 74 74  
  Intelligent M 6.09 5.97 p = .23 
 SD 0.93 1.01  
 N 76 76  
Smart M 6.08 5.97 p = .23 
 SD 0.99 0.95  
 N 74 74  
  Trait effort M 6.32 5.23 p < .001 
   SD 0.85 1.13  
   N 77 77  
  Trait competence M 6.07 5.98 p = .35 
   SD 0.92 0.92  
   N 77 77  
  Successful M 6.05 5.82 p = .03 
   SD 1.11 1.07  
   N 77 77  
  Ambitious M 6.47 4.87 p < .001 
   SD 0.79 1.27  
   N 76 76  
Study 1C Instructor 
Profiles 
Hardworking M 6.40 5.31 p < .001 
 SD 0.80 1.17  
 N 102 102  
Motivated M 6.32 5.02 p < .001 
 SD 0.89 1.11  
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 N 102 102  
Persistent M 5.88 5.26 p < .001 
  SD 1.09 1.23  
  N 102 102  
 Determined M 6.25 5.10 p < .001 
  SD 0.85 1.15  
   N 102 102  
  Competent M 5.91 5.85 p = .55 
   SD 0.93 1.03  
   N 103 103  
  Intelligent M 5.89 6.01 p = .16 
   SD 0.92 0.84  
   N 102 102  
  Smart M 5.91 5.80 p = .21 
   SD 1.13 1.14  
   N 102 102  
  Trait effort M 6.21 5.17 p < .001 
   SD 0.77 1.02  
   N 103 103  
  Trait competence M 5.89 5.88 p = .90 
   SD 0.86 0.88  
   N 103 103  
  Successful M 5.92 5.82 p = .29 
   SD 1.08 1.09  
   N 103 103  
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Note. The index of trait effort is computed as the average of four items (hardworking, 
motivated, persistent, and determined). The index of trait competence is computed as the 
average of three items (competent, intelligent, and smart). 
  
  Ambitious M 6.20 4.88 p < .001 
   SD 0.90 1.09  
   N 103 103  
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Table 2a 
Evaluations of Improved and Consistent Profiles in Study 2 
   Improved Consistent  
Average Focus  Perceived effort  M 6.04 5.29 p = .05 
 SD 1.26 1.15  
 N 28 28  
Trait effort M 6.23 5.48 p < .01 
 SD 0.85 0.93  
 N 28 28  
 Trait competence M 5.62 6.04 p = .03 
  SD 0.90 0.69  
  N 28 28  
 Trait warmth M 5.34 5.32 p = .91 
  SD 0.91 0.93  
  N 28 28  
 Positivity of impression M 5.71 5.79 p = .81 
 SD 1.15 1.07  
 N 28 28  
Trend Focus  Perceived effort  M 5.90 5.00 p = .01 
 SD 1.32 1.26  
 N 40 40  
Trait effort M 6.14 5.07 p = .001 
 SD 1.08 1.15  
 N 39 39  
 Trait competence M 5.59 6.04 p = .02 
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  SD 1.06 0.76  
  N 38 38  
 Trait warmth M 5.31 5.22 p = .67 
  SD 0.90 1.07  
  N 39 39  
 Positivity of impression M 5.82 5.37 p = .05 
 SD 0.93 0.97  
 N 38 38  
Control Condition Perceived effort  M 5.98 5.29 p = .04 
 SD 1.22 1.15  
 N 42 42  
Trait effort M 6.12 5.40 p = .001 
 SD 0.78 0.93  
 N 42 42  
 Trait competence M 5.56 5.91 p < .01 
  SD 0.69 0.62  
  N 42 42  
 Trait warmth M 5.43 5.25 p = .21 
  SD 1.04 0.92  
  N 42 42  
 Positivity of impression M 5.73 5.67 p = .76 
 SD 1.07 0.94  
  N 41 41  
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Table 2b 
Correlations among Judgments in Study 2 
 Average Focus  Trend Focus  Control Condition 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Perceived effort (1)  
.49** .73*** .17 .25 
  
.81*** .62*** .46** .62*** 
  
.70*** .57*** .31† .39* 
Trait effort (2)   
.57** .52** -.16 
   
.74*** .60*** .48** 
   
.57*** .22 .48** 
Trait competence (3)    
.45* .23* 
    
.49** .47** 
    
.06 .29† 
Trait warmth (4)     .28      .52**      .48** 
Positivity of impression (5)                  
Note. The correlations reported here were computed with difference scores (improved –consistent) for each type of judgment. † p < .10, * p < .05, 
** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
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Table 2c 
Correlations among Judgments of the Improved Profile in Study 2 
 Average Focus  Trend Focus  Control Condition 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Perceived effort (1)  
.56** .66*** .42* .24 
  
.74*** .60*** .40* .45** 
  
.64*** .44** .39* .49** 
Trait effort (2)   
.68*** .44* .12 
   
.79*** .53*** .44** 
   
.57*** .42** .37* 
Trait competence (3)    
.60** .48* 
    
.69*** .50** 
    
.29† .34* 
Trait warmth (4)     .47*      .52**      .46** 
Positivity of impression (5)                  
Note. † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
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Table 2d 
Correlations among Judgments of the Consistent Profile in Study 2 
 Average Focus  Trend Focus  Control Condition 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Perceived effort (1)  
.50** .63*** .24 .54** 
  
.64*** .48** .42** .59*** 
  
.65*** .49** -.06 .19 
Trait effort (2)   
.69*** .57* .46* 
   
.58*** .43** .62*** 
   
.55*** .15 .34* 
Trait competence (3)    
.49** .58** 
    
.43** .49** 
    
.28† .29† 
Trait warmth (4)     .37†      .57***      .60*** 
Positivity of impression (5)                  
Note. † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
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Table 2e 
Trait Judgments of Improved and Consistent Profiles in Study 2 
   Improved Consistent  
Average Focus Hardworking M 6.04 5.70 p = .39 
 SD 1.37 1.07  
 N 27 27  
 Motivated M 6.38 5.38 p = .001 
  SD 0.90 1.17  
  N 26 26  
 Persistent M 5.93 5.57 p = .25 
  SD 1.18 1.29  
  N 28 28  
 Determined M 6.50 5.25 p < .001 
  SD 0.92 1.08  
  N 28 28  
 Competent M 5.64 5.96 p = .16 
  SD 1.22 0.96  
  N 28 28  
 Intelligent M 5.50 6.11 p < .01 
  SD 1.07 0.63  
  N 28 28  
 Smart M 5.71 6.04 p = .11 
  SD 0.90 0.74  
  N 28 28  
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 Trait effort* M 6.23 5.48 p < .01 
  SD 0.85 0.93  
  N 28 28  
 Trait competence* M 5.62 6.04 p = .03 
  SD 0.90 0.69  
  N 28 28  
 Successful M 5.89 6.04 p = .54 
  SD 0.88 0.84  
  N 28 28  
 Ambitious M 6.39 5.14 p < .01 
  SD 1.17 1.33  
  N 28 28  
Trend Focus Hardworking 
 
M 6.28 5.36 p = .01 
SD 1.15 1.40  
N 39 39  
Motivated 
 
M 6.26 4.79 p = .001 
 SD 1.14 1.44  
 N 39 39  
 Persistent M 5.84 5.26 p = .08 
  SD 1.35 1.25  
  N 38 38  
 Determined M 6.18 4.87 p < .001 
  SD 1.10 1.36  
  N 39 39  
 Competent M 5.71 6.24 p = .05 
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  SD 1.33 0.97  
 N 38 38  
 Intelligent M 5.47 5.92 p = .04 
 SD 1.08 0.85  
 N 38 38  
Smart M 5.58 5.95 p = .06 
 SD 1.06 0.84  
 N 38 38  
 Trait effort* M 6.14 5.07 p = .001 
  SD 1.08 1.15  
  N 39 39  
 Trait competence* M 5.59 6.04 p = .02 
  SD 1.06 0.76  
  N 38 38  
 Successful M 5.84 5.68 p = .53 
  SD 1.13 1.04  
  N 38 38  
 Ambitious M 6.31 4.69 p < .001 
  SD 1.24 1.40  
  N 39 39  
Control Condition Hardworking M 6.20 5.65 p = .05 
 SD 1.14 1.00  
 N 40 40  
Motivated M 6.36 5.00 p = .001 
 SD 0.73 1.29  
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 N 42 42  
Persistent M 5.71 5.62 p = .71 
 SD 1.17 1.06  
 N 42 42  
Determined M 6.24 5.32 p < .001 
 SD 0.89 1.11  
  N 41 41  
 Competent M 5.76 5.76 p = 1.00 
  SD 0.88 0.91  
  N 42 42  
 Intelligent M 5.40 6.05 p < .001 
  SD 0.73 0.70  
  N 42 42  
 Smart M 5.50 5.93 p < .01 
  SD 0.89 0.78  
  N 42 42  
 Trait effort* M 6.12 5.40 p = .001 
  SD 0.78 0.93  
  N 42 42  
 Trait competence* M 5.56 5.91 p < .01 
  SD 0.69 0.62  
  N 42 42  
 Successful M 5.74 6.07 p = .04 
  SD 0.94 0.81  
  N 42 42  
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Note. The index of trait effort is computed as the average of four items (hardworking, motivated, 
persistent, and determined). The index of trait competence is computed as the average of three 
items (competent, intelligent, and smart). 
 
 Ambitious M 6.36 5.02 p < .001 
  SD 0.73 1.37  
  N 42 42  
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Table 3a 
Evaluations of Improved and Consistent Profiles in Study 3 
   Improved Consistent  
Unpacking condition Perceived effort  M 80.38 68.70 p = .001 
 SD 9.96 21.39  
  N 53 53  
 Trait effort M 6.22 4.61 p < .001 
  SD 0.77 1.34  
  N 53 53  
 Trait competence M 5.81 5.84 p = .80 
  SD 0.77 0.75  
  N 53 53  
 Trait warmth M 5.34 4.85 p = .001 
  SD 0.89 1.03  
  N 53 53  
 Positivity of impression M 5.83 5.12 p < .01 
  SD 0.96 1.32  
  N 52 52  
 Deservingness M 5.75 5.04 p = .02 
  SD 1.05 1.62  
  N 53 53  
Control Condition Perceived effort  M 81.48 69.52 p = .001 
 SD 15.18 17.98  
 N 52 52  
Trait effort M 6.11 4.94 p < .001 
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 SD 0.93 1.32  
 N 52 52  
Trait competence M 5.83 5.81 p = .93 
 SD 0.93 0.83  
 N 52 52  
Trait warmth M 5.42 5.09 p = .04 
 SD 0.92 0.93  
 N 52 52  
Positivity of impression M 5.65 5.12 p = .01 
 SD 1.08 1.13  
 N 52 52  
Deservingness M 5.92 5.33 p = .01 
  SD 0.96 1.32  
  N 51 51  
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Table 3b 
Unpacking Effort Judgments (The Unpacking Condition in Study 3) 
 Improved Consistent p 
Effort in 2009 68.45 74.88 p = .13 
Effort in 2010 69.74 70.09 p = .92 
Effort in 2011 75.38 72.11 p = .31 
Effort in 2012 78.13 66.75 p < .01 
Effort in 2013 83.75 65.00 p < .001 
Change in effort over the five years* 15.30 -9.89 p < .001 
Overall effort 80.38 68.70 p = .001 
* Change in effort over the five years was calculated by subtracting the effort rating that each 
participant provided for 2009 from the rating for 2013. 
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Table 3c 
Correlations among Judgments in Study 3 
  Unpacking  Control 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Perceived effort (1)  .78*** .27† .04 .49*** .63***   .69*** .55*** .33* .72*** .61*** 
Trait effort (2)   .22 -.01 .64*** .71***    .60*** .39* .82*** .68*** 
Trait competence (3)    .27† .48*** .55***     .41** .78*** .56*** 
Trait warmth (4)     .06 .16      .54*** .26† 
Positivity of impression (5)      .65***       .71*** 
Deservingness (6)              
Note. The correlations reported here were computed with difference scores (improved –consistent) for each type of judgment. * p < .05, ** p < .01, 
*** p < .001. 
96 
 
Table 3d 
Correlations among Judgments of the Improved Profile in Study 3 
 Unpacking  Control 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Perceived effort (1)  .58*** .28* .04 .36** .47***   .58*** .52*** .37** .50*** .44** 
Trait effort (2)   .43** .06 .61*** .61***    .72*** .45** .70*** .72*** 
Trait competence (3)    .36** .37** .36**     .59*** .61*** .48*** 
Trait warmth (4)     .36** -.06      .74*** .40** 
Positivity of impression (5)      .34*       .54*** 
Deservingness (6)              
Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
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Table 3e 
Correlations among Judgments of the Consistent Profile in Study 3 
 Unpacking  Control 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Perceived effort (1)  .72*** .24† .12 .45** .50***   .54*** .35* .12 .52*** .53*** 
Trait effort (2)   .33* .40** .65** .68***    .42** .42** .65*** .64*** 
Trait competence (3)    .35* .49*** .46**     .49*** .69*** .49*** 
Trait warmth (4)     .47** .37**      .66*** .23 
Positivity of impression (5)      -.24†       .54*** 
Deservingness (6)              
Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
98 
 
Table 3f 
Trait Judgments of Improved and Consistent Profiles in Study 3 
   Improved Consistent  
Unpacking condition Hardworking M 6.21 4.91 p < .001 
 SD 0.84 1.32  
 N 53 53  
 Motivated M 6.23 4.36 p < .001 
  SD 0.89 1.59  
  N 53 53  
 Persistent M 6.15 4.70 p < .001 
  SD 0.84 1.49  
  N 53 53  
 Determined M 6.29 4.50 p < .001 
  SD 0.85 1.39  
  N 52 52  
 Competent M 5.91 5.83 p = .58 
  SD 0.93 0.94  
  N 53 53  
 Intelligent M 5.74 5.81 p = .63 
  SD 0.96 .90  
  N 53 53  
 Smart M 5.77 5.87 p = .53 
  SD 0.87 0.79  
  N 53 53  
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 Trait effort M 6.22 4.61 p < .001 
  SD 0.77 1.34  
  N 53 53  
 Trait competence M 5.81 5.84 p = .80 
  SD 0.77 0.75  
  N 53 53  
 Successful M 5.96 5.46 p = .01 
  SD 0.79 1.09  
  N 52 52  
 Ambitious M 6.19 4.26 p < .001 
  SD 0.96 1.63  
  N 53 53  
Control condition Hardworking 
 
M 6.21 5.17 p < .001 
SD 1.11 1.44  
N 52 52  
Motivated 
 
M 6.20 4.73 p < .001 
 SD 0.92 1.54  
 N 51 51  
 Persistent M 5.90 5.10 p = .01 
  SD 1.24 1.47  
  N 51 51  
 Determined M 6.14 4.88 p < .001 
  SD 0.95 1.36  
  N 50 50  
 Competent M 5.98 5.92 p = .74 
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Note. The index of trait effort is computed as the average of four items (hardworking, motivated, 
persistent, and determined). The index of trait competence is computed as the average of three 
items (competent, intelligent, and smart). 
 
 
  SD 1.02 0.95  
 N 52 52  
 Intelligent M 5.81 5.87 p = .70 
 SD 0.93 0.84  
 N 52 52  
Smart M 5.69 5.65 p = .80 
 SD 1.29 1.28  
 N 52 52  
 Trait effort M 6.11 4.94 p < .001 
  SD 0.93 1.32  
  N 52 52  
 Trait competence M 5.83 5.81 p = .93 
  SD 0.93 0.83  
  N 52 52  
 Successful M 5.87 5.50 p = .06 
  SD 0.99 1.08  
  N 52 52  
 Ambitious M 6.18 4.67 p < .001 
  SD 0.99 1.47  
  N 51 51  
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Table 3g 
Mediation of the Deservingness Judgments by Perceived Effort in Study 3 
 Variable B SE t df  
Unpacking condition (Constant) -4.53 2.17 -2.09 50 p = .04 
 Perceived effort sum 0.03 0.01 2.14 50 p = .04 
 Perceived effort difference  0.07 0.01 5.89 50 p < .001 
Control condition (Constant) 1.33 1.26 1.05 48 p = .30 
 Perceived effort sum -0.01 0.01 -1.00 48 p = .32 
 Perceived effort difference  0.04 0.01 5.12 48 p < .001 
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Table 3h 
Mediation of the Deservingness Judgments by Trait Effort in Study 3 
 Variable B SE t df  
Unpacking condition (Constant) 0.05 2.17 0.03 46 p = .98 
 Trait effort sum -0.07 0.20 -0.34 46 p = .74 
 Trait competence sum 0.01 0.18 0.06 46 p = .95 
 Trait warmth sum 0.00 0.14 0.00 46 p = 1.00 
 Trait effort difference 0.76 0.14 5.55 46 p < .001 
 Trait competence difference 0.96 0.22 4.33 46 p < .001 
 Trait warmth difference 0.11 0.19 0.58 46 p = .56 
Control condition (Constant) -0.82 1.59 -0.51 44 p = .611 
 Trait effort sum 0.06 0.15 0.38 44 p = .71 
 Trait competence sum -0.16 0.17 -0.98 44 p = .33 
 Trait warmth sum 0.18 0.14 1.28 44 p = .21 
 Trait effort difference 0.57 0.14 3.98 44 p < .001 
 Trait competence difference 0.38 0.22 1.68 44 p = .10 
 Trait warmth difference -0.01 0.17 -0.04 44 p = .97 
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Table 4 
Effort and Ability Mentions for Supporting the Improved and Consistent Profiles in Study 4 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  Profile Supported  
  Improved 
(n = 56) 
Consistent  
(n = 55) 
 
Effort mentions N  25 13  
 Percentage within condition 44.6%
 
23.6%
 
p = .02 
Ability mentions N  3 9  
 Percentage within condition 5.4%
 
16.4%
 
p = .06 
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Table 5a 
Evaluations of Improved and Consistent Profiles in Study 5 
Context condition   Improved Consistent  
High ambiguity 
(no average) 
Perceived effort  M 82.76 69.20 p = .001 
 SD 13.53 19.44  
 N 54 54  
Trait effort M 6.20 4.86 p < .001 
 SD 0.94 1.37  
 N 56 56  
Trait competence M 5.56 5.58 p = .91 
 SD 0.92 0.94  
 N 56 56  
Trait warmth M 5.45 5.31 p = .40 
 SD 0.95 1.04  
 N 56 56  
Positivity of impression M 5.75 5.27 p = .03 
SD 1.01 1.17  
 N 56 56  
Deservingness M 5.98 5.21 p = .01 
 SD 0.98 1.45  
 N 56 56  
Low ambiguity 
(average presented) 
 
Perceived effort  M 73.16 86.00 p = .03 
 SD 24.89 15.92  
 N 33 33  
Trait effort M 5.48 6.54 p = .001 
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 SD 1.37 0.80  
 N 32 32  
Trait competence M 6.21 6.03 p = .22 
 SD 0.92 0.91  
 N 32 32  
Trait warmth M 5.80 5.95 p = .47 
 SD 1.04 1.09  
 N 32 32  
Positivity of impression M 5.78 6.22 p = .08 
SD 1.18 1.07  
N 32 32  
Deservingness M 5.66 6.34 p = .02 
 SD 1.45 1.00  
 N 33 33  
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Table 5b 
Correlations among Judgments in Study 5 
 High ambiguity  Low ambiguity 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Perceived effort (1)  .65*** .59*** .33* .54*** .62***   .68*** .47** .57** .56** .71*** 
Trait effort (2)   .67*** .58*** .77*** .84***    .55*** .59*** .64*** .76*** 
Trait competence (3)    .68*** .76*** .74***     .77*** .67*** .56** 
Trait warmth (4)     .78*** .68***      .78*** .56** 
Positivity of impression (5)      .77***       .71*** 
Deservingness (6)              
Note. The correlations reported here were computed with difference scores (improved –consistent) for each type of judgment. * p < .05, ** p < .01, 
*** p < .001. 
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Table 5c 
Correlations among Judgments of the Improved Profile in Study 5 
 High ambiguity  Low ambiguity 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Perceived effort (1)  .54*** .45** .28* .39** .43**   .83*** .41* .43* .63*** .81*** 
Trait effort (2)   .62*** .60*** .62*** .64***    .47** .40* .67*** .78*** 
Trait competence (3)    .67*** .70*** .49***     .68*** .64*** .48** 
Trait warmth (4)     .79*** .52***      .52** .37* 
Positivity of impression (5)      .53***       .63*** 
Deservingness (6)              
Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
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Table 5d 
Correlations among Judgments of the Consistent Profile in Study 5 
 High ambiguity  Low ambiguity 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Perceived effort (1)  .62*** .59*** .46*** .63*** .66***   .49*** .28 .51** .36* .40* 
Trait effort (2)   .66*** .73*** .81*** .80***    .54** .68*** .46** .66*** 
Trait competence (3)    .65*** .69*** .59***     .71*** .72*** .52** 
Trait warmth (4)     .82*** .69***      .75*** .54*** 
Positivity of impression (5)      .78***       .65*** 
Deservingness (6)              
Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.
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Table 5e 
Trait Judgments of Improved and Consistent Profiles in Study 5 
   Improved Consistent  
High ambiguity 
(no average) 
Hardworking M 6.29 5.13 p < .001 
 SD 0.95 1.42  
 N 56 56  
 Motivated M 6.25 4.56 p < .001 
  SD 1.00 1.52  
  N 55 55  
 Persistent M 6.18 4.87 p < .001 
  SD 1.16 1.50  
  N 55 55  
 Determined M 6.09 4.84 p < .001 
  SD 1.10 1.46  
  N 56 56  
 Competent M 5.84 5.78 p = .80 
  SD 0.94 1.20  
  N 55 55  
 Intelligent M 5.50 5.63 p = .43 
  SD 0.97 0.95  
  N 56 56  
 Smart M 5.32 5.32 p = 1.00 
  SD 1.39 1.35  
  N 56 56  
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 Trait effort M 6.20 4.86 p < .001 
  SD 0.94 1.37  
  N 56 56  
 Trait competence M 5.56 5.58 p = .91 
  SD 0.92 0.94  
  N 56 56  
 Successful M 5.84 5.59 p = .25 
  SD 0.97 1.26  
  N 56 56  
 Ambitious M 6.18 4.48 p < .001 
  SD 1.01 1.73  
  N 56 56  
Low ambiguity 
(average presented) 
 
Hardworking M 5.68 6.45 p = .02 
SD 1.42 1.03  
N 31 31  
Motivated 
 
M 5.06 6.58 p < .001 
 SD 1.57 0.72  
 N 31 31  
 Persistent M 5.73 6.57 p = .01 
  SD 1.26 0.86  
  N 30 30  
 Determined M 5.33 6.50 p < .01 
  SD 1.56 0.86  
  N 30 30  
 Competent M 6.34 6.22 p = .54 
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Note. The index of trait effort is computed as the average of four items (hardworking, motivated, 
persistent, and determined). The index of trait competence is computed as the average of three 
items (competent, intelligent, and smart). 
  
  SD 0.97 0.91  
 N 32 32  
 Intelligent M 6.13 6.00 p = .46 
 SD 1.01 1.02  
 N 32 32  
Smart M 6.16 5.88 p = .13 
 SD 1.14 1.36  
 N 32 32  
 Trait effort M 5.48 6.54 p = .001 
  SD 1.37 0.80  
  N 32 32  
 Trait competence M 6.21 6.03 p = .22 
  SD 0.92 0.91  
  N 32 32  
 Successful M 6.17 6.03 p = .59 
  SD 1.18 1.10  
  N 30 30  
 Ambitious M 5.03 6.47 p < .001 
  SD 1.67 1.08  
  N 32 32  
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Table 5f 
Mediation of the Deservingness Judgments by Perceived Effort in Study 5 
 Variable B SE t df  
High ambiguity 
(no average) 
(Constant) 2.08 1.98 1.05 51 p = .30 
Perceived effort sum -0.01 0.01 -0.97 51 p = .34 
Perceived effort difference  0.04 0.01 4.96 51 p < .001 
Low ambiguity 
(average presented) 
(Constant) -3.22 1.29 -2.50 29 p = .02 
Perceived effort sum 0.02 0.01 2.42 29 p = .02 
Perceived effort difference  0.03 0.01 4.38 29 p < .001 
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Table 5g 
Mediation of the Deservingness Judgments by Trait Effort in Study 5 
 Variable B SE t df  
High ambiguity 
(no average) 
(Constant) 0.12 1.21 0.10 49 p = .93 
Trait effort sum -0.02 0.15 -0.02 49 p = .89 
Trait competence sum -0.01 0.13 -0.01 49 p = .94 
Trait warmth sum 0.00 0.15 0.00 49 p = .98 
Trait effort difference 0.67 0.12 0.57 49 p < .001 
Trait competence difference 0.40 0.18 0.23 49 p = .03 
Trait warmth difference 0.32 0.16 0.19 49 p = .05 
Low ambiguity 
(average presented) 
(Constant) -1.48 2.18 -0.68 25 p = .50 
Trait effort sum -0.01 0.22 -0.03 25 p = .97 
Trait competence sum -0.04 0.18 -0.21 25 p = .83 
Trait warmth sum 0.17 0.19 0.91 25 p = .37 
Trait effort difference 0.69 0.20 3.48 25 p < .01 
Trait competence difference 0.46 0.43 1.08 25 p = .29 
Trait warmth difference 0.02 0.30 0.05 25 p = .96 
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Table 6a 
Evaluations of Improved and Consistent Profiles in Study 6 
Context condition   Improved Consistent  
High ambiguity 
(no average) 
Perceived effort  M 85.76 65.02 p <.001 
 SD 11.59 18.35  
 N 46 51  
Trait effort M 6.20 4.52 p <.001 
  SD 0.83 1.30  
  N 46 51  
 Trait competence M 5.93 5.14 p <.001 
  SD 0.70 1.06  
  N 46 51  
 Trait warmth M 5.66 4.87 p <.001 
  SD 0.87 0.97  
  N 46 51  
 Positivity of impression M 5.87 4.92 p <.001 
  SD 0.98 1.02  
  N 46 51  
 Deservingness M 6.24 4.47 p <.001 
  SD 0.79 1.24  
  N 46 51  
Low ambiguity 
(average presented) 
 
Perceived effort  M 84.98 83.67 p = .69 
 SD 13.21 17.16  
 N 44 43  
 Trait effort M 6.03 6.02 p = .96 
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  SD 0.99 1.16  
  N 44 43  
 Trait competence M 5.88 5.87 p = .96 
  SD 1.01 1.02  
  N 44 43  
 Trait warmth M 5.41 5.85 p = .07 
  SD 1.22 1.00  
  N 44 43  
 Positivity of impression M 6.05 5.79 p = .25 
  SD 0.96 1.08  
  N 44 43  
 Deservingness M 6.23 5.88 p = .11 
  SD 0.71 1.20  
  N 44 43  
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Table 6b 
Correlations among Judgments of the Improved Profile in Study 6 
 High ambiguity  Low ambiguity 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Perceived effort (1)  .73*** .60*** .54*** .55*** .73***   .49** .44** .28† .53*** .60*** 
Trait effort (2)   .76*** .65*** .54*** .75***    .74*** .63*** .71*** .61*** 
Trait competence (3)    .66*** .61*** .54***     .74*** .66*** .64*** 
Trait warmth (4)     .62*** .48**      .70*** .50** 
Positivity of impression (5)      .50***       .77*** 
Deservingness (6)              
Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
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Table 6c 
Correlations among Judgments of the Consistent Profile in Study 6 
 High ambiguity  Low ambiguity 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Perceived effort (1)  .78*** .59*** .49*** .72*** .73***   .90*** .81*** .77*** .77*** .74*** 
Trait effort (2)   .64*** .60*** .71*** .74***    .80*** .78*** .77*** .72*** 
Trait competence (3)    .80*** .61*** .42**     .78*** .81*** .72*** 
Trait warmth (4)     .57*** .40**      .74*** .68*** 
Positivity of impression (5)      .71***       .64*** 
Deservingness (6)              
Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.
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Table 6d 
Trait Judgments of Improved and Consistent Profiles in Study 6 
   Improved Consistent  
High ambiguity 
(no average) 
Hardworking M 6.22 4.72 p < .001 
 SD 0.89 1.36  
 N 46 50  
 Motivated M 6.20 4.29 p < .001 
  SD 0.89 1.30  
  N 46 51  
 Persistent M 6.16 4.55 p < .001 
  SD 0.93 1.46  
  N 45 51  
 Determined M 6.20 4.55 p < .001 
  SD 0.93 1.50  
  N 46 51  
 Competent M 6.24 5.24 p < .001 
  SD 0.79 1.21  
  N 46 51  
 Intelligent M 5.74 5.04 p = .001 
  SD 0.80 1.15  
  N 46 51  
 Smart M 5.80 5.14 p < .001 
  SD 0.78 1.09  
  N 46 50  
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 Trait effort M 6.20 4.52 p <.001 
  SD 0.83 1.30  
  N 46 51  
 Trait competence M 5.93 5.14 p <.001 
  SD 0.70 1.06  
  N 46 51  
 Successful M 6.15 4.90 p < .001 
  SD 0.82 1.30  
  N 46 51  
 Ambitious M 6.20 4.10 p < .001 
  SD 0.89 1.36  
  N 46 51  
Low ambiguity 
(average presented) 
 
Hardworking 
 
M 6.09 6.05 p = .87 
SD 1.20 1.19  
N 44 42  
Motivated 
 
M 6.02 6.07 p = .85 
 SD 1.26 1.24  
 N 44 43  
 Persistent M 5.91 5.95 p = .85 
  SD 1.24 1.17  
  N 44 43  
 Determined M 6.09 6.00 p = .70 
  SD 0.91 1.23  
  N 44 43  
 Competent M 6.02 6.09 p = .79 
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Note. The index of trait effort is computed as the average of four items (hardworking, motivated, 
persistent, and determined). The index of trait competence is computed as the average of three 
items (competent, intelligent, and smart). 
  
  SD 1.39 1.07  
 N 44 43  
 Intelligent M 5.82 5.70 p = .59 
 SD 1.04 1.06  
 N 44 43  
Smart M 5.80 5.81 p = .94 
 SD 1.15 1.08  
 N 44 43  
 Trait competence M 5.88 5.87 p = .96 
  SD 1.01 1.02  
  N 44 43  
 Trait warmth M 5.41 5.85 p = .07 
  SD 1.22 1.00  
  N 44 43  
 Successful M 6.05 6.02 p = .93 
  SD 1.14 1.10  
  N 44 43  
 Ambitious M 6.11 5.81 p = .22 
  SD 1.02 1.22  
  N 44 43  
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Figure 1. The moderated mediation model examined in Study 6 with perceived effort as 
the mediator. The ambiguity (low ambiguity = -1, high ambiguity = 1) × profile 
(consistent = -1, improved = 1) interaction was a significant predictor of deservingness, B 
= 0.36, t(180) = 4.73, p < .001. Perceived effort mediated the effects of profile on 
deservingness judgments, and this mediation was moderated by the ambiguity of the 
decision context. The main effects of profile and ambiguity are controlled for in this 
analysis. *p < .05, ***p < .001. 
 
  
Perceived effort 
Deservingness Ambiguity × profile 
4.86*** 0.05*** 
0.13* 
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Figure 2. The mediation by perceived effort in the high ambiguity condition in Study 6. 
The total effect of profile (-1 = consistent profile, 1 = improved profile) on deservingness 
judgments was significant, B = 0.88, t(96) = 8.27, p < .001.  Perceived effort mediated the 
effect of profile on deservingness judgments in this condition. ***p < .001. 
 
  
Perceived effort 
Deservingness Profile 
0.37*** 
0.05*** 10.37 *** 
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Figure 3. The mediation by perceived effort in the low ambiguity condition in Study 6. 
The total effect of profile (-1 = consistent profile, 1 = improved profile) on deservingness 
judgments was not significant, B = 0.17, t(96) = 1.63, p = .11.  Perceived effort did not 
mediate the effect of profile on deservingness judgments in this condition. ***p < .001. 
  
Perceived effort 
Deservingness Profile 
0.65 0.04*** 
0.14 
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Figure 4. The moderated mediation model examined in Study 6 with trait effort as the 
mediator. The ambiguity (low ambiguity = -1, high ambiguity = 1) × profile (consistent = 
-1, improved = 1) interaction was a significant predictor of deservingness, B = 0.22, 
t(178) = 3.31, p = .001. Trait effort mediated the effects of profile on deservingness 
judgments, and this mediation was moderated by the ambiguity of the decision context. 
The main effects of profile and ambiguity, as well as trait competence and trait warmth, 
were controlled for in this analysis. ***p < .001. 
 
  
Trait effort 
Deservingness Ambiguity × profile 
0.22*** 0.60*** 
0.08 
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Figure 5. The mediation by trait effort judgments in the high ambiguity condition in 
Study 6. The total effect of profile (-1 = consistent profile, 1 = improved profile) on 
deservingness judgments was significant, B = 0.66, t(96) = 6.24, p < .001.  Effort 
perceptions mediated the effect of profile on deservingness judgments in this condition. 
Trait competence and trait warmth were controlled for in this analysis. *p < .05, ***p < 
.001. 
 
  
Trait effort 
Deservingness Profile 
0.76*** 0.49*** 
0.28* 
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Figure 6. The mediation by trait effort judgments in the low ambiguity condition in Study 
6. The total effect of profile (-1 = consistent profile, 1 = improved profile) on 
deservingness judgments was significant, B = 0.19, t(96) = 2.36, p = .03.  Trait effort did 
not mediate the effect of profile on deservingness judgments in this condition. Trait 
competence and trait warmth were controlled for in this analysis.   * p < .05,**p < .01. 
 
 
  
Trait effort 
Deservingness Profile 
0.34** 0.06 
0.18* 
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Appendix A 
Student Profiles (Study 1A) 
 
 
Please read the following question carefully and select the number that best 
represents your own opinion about each of the students: 
 
Now, we are interested in the general impression that you have formed about Kristen and 
Sarah, based on the short profiles that you read. Each of the following items includes an 
opposite pair of characteristics that we can use to describe other people. Please read each 
pair and select the number that best represents where you think each of the two students 
stands in terms of these characteristics. 
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Appendix B 
Exploring Potential Moderators of Effort and Deservingness Judgments 
Gender 
In all studies, we examined whether participants’ gender influenced effort 
perceptions and judgments of trait effort for the improved profile relative to the 
consistent profile. In Studies 1A-1C, gender did not influence any of the effects. In Study 
2, the gender × profile interaction was significant for both effort perceptions (F[1, 98] = 
5.30, p = .02) and judgments of trait effort (F[1, 98] = 8.56, p = .004), indicating that 
female participants rated the improved employee higher than the consistent employee on 
both measures (p’s < .001), whereas male participants rated both employees equally (p’s 
> .05). Similarly, in Study 3, the gender × profile interaction was significant for both 
effort perceptions (F[1, 95] = 4.91, p = .03) and trait effort (F[1, 95] = 8.10, p = .01). On 
perceptions of effort, female participants rated the improved employee significantly 
higher than the consistent employee (p < .001), whereas the difference was not significant 
for male participants (p = .10). On trait effort, both male and female participants rated the 
improved employee significantly higher than the consistent employee (p’s < .001), but 
the difference was greater in ratings provided by female participants. In Study 4, a 
logistic regression indicated that gender did not influence the degree to which effort was 
mentioned when supporting the improved profile, relative to the consistent profile. 
Likewise, in Studies 5 and 6, gender did not influence judgments of effort for the 
improved profile, relative to the consistent profile.  
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Ratings of deservingness of the candidates for promotion were examined in 
Studies 3, 5, and 6 so we also tested whether gender influenced deservingness judgments 
in these three studies. The relevant interactions involving gender and profile type were 
not significant (p’s > .05).  
Overall, the majority of studies did not reveal significant gender × profile 
interactions with judgments of effort and deservingness. The lack of statistical 
significance for some of the results obtained by male participants in Studies 2 and 3 could 
possibly be attributed to the smaller number of male (vs. female) participants in these 
studies. Perhaps these small numbers did not enable us to reliably detect the differences 
in judgments of the improved versus consistent profiles among male respondents. Given 
the bulk of evidence, it appears that gender does not have a reliable influence on the 
effects found in the present studies. 
Ethnic Background 
 Eastern cultures tend to perceive patterns of change in ways that are different 
from Western cultures (Ji , Nisbett, & Su, 2001). Although the samples of participants in 
the present studies were all residents of the United States and Canada, we were interested 
in comparing the judgments obtained from participants with East Asian versus White 
ethnic backgrounds. We were only able to examine these comparisons in Studies 1A, 1C, 
and 2 because in all of the other studies there was at least one condition with fewer than 
10 East Asian participants. In Study 1A, the ethnicity × profile interaction was significant 
with trait effort (F[1,55] = 3.92, p = .05) but not with effort perceptions (p > .05). The 
relevant contrasts indicated that participants from both ethnic backgrounds perceived the 
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improved student to be more hardworking than the consistent student (p’s < .05), but the 
difference between the ratings of the two profiles was greater among East Asian 
participants. In Study 1C and in Study 2, the interactions involving ethnicity and profile 
type were not significant (p’s > .05). Overall, it is difficult to form conclusions about 
cultural differences in the use of improvement as a heuristic for judging effort based on 
the limited information in the present studies. Future research is needed to examine 
potential cross-cultural differences in this domain. 
Analysis-Holism 
We wanted to examine whether variability in participants’ holistic thinking 
tendencies would influence judgments pertaining to the main variables examined in the 
present research. In Studies 1-4, participants completed the analysis-holism scale (AHS; 
Choi, Koo, & Choi, 2007). We computed their overall score on this scale and examined 
its correlations with the difference scores (improved – consistent) on the main measures 
in Studies 1A-1C and within each of the conditions in Studies 2 and 3. The only 
significant correlation was found in the control condition in Study 3 whereby higher AHS 
scores (i.e., having a higher holistic thinking tendency) were associated with viewing the 
improved employee to be more hardworking relative to the consistent employee, r(48) = 
.28, p = .05. No other effects were significant. In Study 4, we ran a logistic regression 
with profile, AHS scores, and their interaction as predictors of effort mentions. The AHS 
× profile interaction did not predict effort mentions, p > .05. Overall, the present research 
provided very little evidence concerning the potential moderating role of analytical 
reasoning/holistic thinking tendencies in judging effort.  
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Lay Theories of Personality 
 We examined the correlations of lay theories of personality (Dweck & Leggett, 
1988) with difference scores (improved – consistent) on the main measures in Studies 
1A-1C and within each of the conditions in Studies 2 and 5. In all of these studies, lay 
theories did not predict judgements of the improved profile relative to the consistent 
profile on effort perceptions, trait effort, or deservingness (when applicable), p’s > .05. 
We also examined whether lay theories predicted whether effort was mentioned in 
support of the profiles in Study 4. The lay theories × profile interaction was not 
significant, p > .05. Likewise, in Study 6, a series of regression analyses indicated that lay 
theories of personality did not moderate any of the effects found with effort perceptions, 
trait effort, or deservingness judgments (p’s > .05). 
Lay Theories of Intelligence 
 We examined the correlations of lay theories of intelligence (Dweck & Leggett, 
1988) with difference scores (improved – consistent) on the main measures within 
Studies 1B and 1C; and within each of the conditions in Studies 2 and 5. In Studies 1B, 
1C, and 5, lay theories were not significantly correlated with the difference scores for 
effort perceptions, trait effort, or deservingness (when applicable), p’s > .05. In the 
average focus condition in Study 2, however, having a more incremental theory of 
intelligence was associated with perceptions of lower effort in the improved profile 
relative to the consistent profile, r(27) = -.48, p = .01. In contrast, in the trend focus 
condition in the same study, having a more incremental theory of intelligence was 
associated with perceptions of higher effort in the improved profile relative to the 
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consistent profile, r(39) = .37, p = .02. These results were not anticipated and can 
potentially be attributed to the manipulation procedure. However, we would hesitate to 
draw conclusions from these correlations given the small sample sizes within the 
conditions. A logistic regression in Study 4 showed that the lay theories × profile 
interaction was not significant in predicting effort mentions, p > .05. In Study 6, a series 
of regression analyses indicated that lay theories of intelligence did not moderate any of 
the effects found with effort perceptions, trait effort, or deservingness judgments (p’s > 
.05). 
Experience with Hiring Decisions 
Studies 3, 5, and 6 asked participants to rate the improved and consistent profiles 
on deservingness of a job promotion. Hence, we thought that experience with hiring and 
recruitment decisions would be relevant for making these judgments. Participants were 
asked whether they have any previous experience with such hiring and/or recruitment, 
and we examined whether this influenced their judgements of the two profiles on 
perceptions of effort, trait effort, and deservingness. In Study 3, one-third of participants 
(33.33%) reported having previous experience with hiring or recruitment decisions. The 
experiences that they reported included screening resumes, conducting interviews, and 
providing input in selection decisions. Interactions involving hiring experience were not 
significant in predicting effort perceptions or deservingness judgments (p’s > .05). 
However, the hiring experience × profile interaction predicted judgments of trait effort, F 
(1, 97) = 3.97, p = .05. Participants who had some previous experience with hiring 
decisions, as well as those who did not have such experience, perceived the improved 
candidate to be more hardworking than the consistent candidate (p’s < .001); but the 
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difference was slightly larger among those who had previous experience. In Study 5, 
25.6% of participants reported having previous experience with hiring or recruitment 
decisions (e.g., scanning resumes, interviewing job candidates at their workplace, etc.). 
Interactions involving hiring experience were not significant in predicting effort 
perceptions, trait effort, or deservingness judgments (p’s > .05). In Study 6, 29.6% of 
participants reported having previous experience with hiring or recruitment in their 
workplace. However, these participants were split between the four experimental 
conditions (6-19 participants per condition) in a way that made it difficult to examine and 
interpret the potential moderating role of hiring experience in this study. Overall, the 
results of the present studies provide no evidence of hiring experience eliminating the use 
of improvement as a heuristic for judging effort. However, more research is needed to 
examine the judgments of experts who have substantial experience with hiring decisions, 
because the present studies do not speak directly to judgment processes among those who 
have a high level of expertise.   
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Appendix C 
Employee Profiles (Study 1B) 
 
John Thompson and Andrew McDonald are software developers in ICSA Software. Their 
role as software developers requires good attention to detail and the ability to work 
efficiently under time pressure. John and Andrew have been working in the company as 
junior developers since 2008. 
  
Every year, the performance of employees in ICSA Software is evaluated by the 
employees' supervisors.  
 
The following performance ratings of John and Andrew represent the overall evaluations 
that they received each year from their supervisors. Every year, performance was rated on 
a 10-point scale with 1 indicating unsatisfactory performance, and 10 indicating 
excellent performance. 
 
 
  
 
In this section, we are interested in the general impression that you have formed about 
John and Andrew, based on the short profiles that you read. 
 
Each of the following items includes an opposite pair of characteristics that we can use to 
describe other people. Please read each pair and select the number that best represents 
where you think each of the two employees stands in terms of these characteristics.  
138 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
139 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
140 
 
Appendix D 
Instructor Profiles (Study 1C) 
Jane Smith and Susan King are two course instructors that joined Laurier in 2011.  Below 
are the evaluations that Jane and Susan have received in each of their three years at 
Laurier. For every year, you will see ratings of overall 
quality, helpfulness, clarity and easiness. 
 
These ratings were provided by students on an independent professor evaluation website 
that is not affiliated with the university. 
  
 
 
Please read the following question carefully and select the number that best 
represents your own opinion about the two course instructors: 
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In this section, we are interested in the general impression that you have formed about 
Jane and Susan, based on the profiles that you read. 
 
Each of the following items includes an opposite pair of characteristics that we can use to 
describe other people. Please read each pair and select the number that best represents 
where you think each of the two instructors stands in terms of these characteristics.  
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Appendix E 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis of Trait Effort and Trait Ability in Studies 1A-1C 
To verify that the trait competence and the trait ability indices reflected two types 
of traits that were distinguishable from one another, we conducted Confirmatory Factor 
Analyses. First, we combined the data sets from Studies 1A-1C (n = 242). For each type 
of profile (improved vs. consistent), we specified the structural model and conducted 
Confirmatory Factor Analyses using the software program AMOS (Arbuckle & Wothke, 
1999). Seven items were included in each analysis: hardworking, motivated, persistent, 
determined, competent, intelligent, and smart. The first four items were intended to 
measure perceptions of trait effort in the respective profile, whereas the latter four were 
intended to measure trait ability. The results are presented in the two figures below 
(Appendix Figure 1 and Appendix Figure 2). 
 
Appendix Figure 1. Confirmatory factor analysis of trait ability and trait effort in the 
improved profiles (Studies 1A-1C). The two-factor model fit is adequate for the 
improved profiles. The unstandardized estimates are presented in the above diagram. 
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Appendix Figure 2. Confirmatory factor analysis of trait ability and trait effort in the 
consistent profiles (Studies 1A-1C). The two-factor model fit is excellent for the 
consistent profiles. The unstandardized estimates are presented in the above diagram.  
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Appendix F 
Employee Profiles (Study 2) 
John Thompson and Andrew McDonald are software developers in ICSA Software. Their 
role as software developers requires good attention to detail and the ability to work 
efficiently under time pressure. John and Andrew have been working in the company as 
junior developers since 2008. 
  
Every year, the performance of employees in ICSA Software is evaluated by the 
employees' supervisors.  
 
The following performance ratings of John and Andrew represent the overall evaluations 
that they received each year from their peers and supervisors. Every year, performance 
was rated on a 10-point scale with 1 indicating poor performance, and 10 indicating 
outstanding performance. 
 
Trend focus condition: 
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Average focus condition: 
 
 
 
 
Please read the following question carefully and select the number that best 
represents your own opinion about the employees: 
 
 
In this section, we are interested in the general impression that you have formed about 
John and Andrew, based on the short profiles that you read. 
 
Each of the following items includes an opposite pair of characteristics that we can use to 
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describe other people. Please read each pair and select the number that best represents 
where you think each of the two employees stands in terms of these characteristics.  
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Appendix G 
Profiles of Sales Representatives (Study 5) 
John Thompson and Andrew MacDonald are two sales representatives at IHC Canada. 
IHC is a company that provides innovative electric heating systems to home owners in 
Canada.  John and Andrew joined the company as sales representatives in 2009. Their job 
is to acquire new customers by contacting home owners and educating them about the 
innovative electric heating systems that IHC offers. 
  
The graphs below display the unit sales for John and Andrew over the course of their 
career with IHC Canada. In other words, they show you how many heating system units 
John and Andrew managed to sell each year.   
  
(Low ambiguity condition: Note that the average for sales representatives in IHC 
Canada is around 250 units sold per year.)
 
 
 
In this section, we are interested in the general impression that you have formed about 
John and Andrew, based on the short profiles that you read. 
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Each of the following items includes an opposite pair of characteristics that we can use to 
describe other people. Please read each pair and select the number that best represents 
where you think each of the two employees stands in terms of these characteristics.  
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 Appendix H 
Detailed Results and Forest Plots of the Meta-Analyses (Study 7) 
Effort Perceptions 
 
Trait Effort  
 
Trait Competence  
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Deservingness Judgments 
 
